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LICENSED TO KILL: A DEFENSE OF 
VICARIOUS LIABILITY UNDER THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
DEVON LEA DAMIANO† 
ABSTRACT 
  The Endangered Species Act (ESA) makes it illegal to “take” an 
endangered and threatened species by killing, harming, or harassing 
the animal. Although the classic example of a take is an individual 
poacher shooting an endangered species, these protected species are 
also harmed by larger-scale policies and programs. In several court 
cases, local and state governments have been held vicariously liable 
for the take of endangered species when their policies or actions 
caused third parties to commit a take. 
  The vicarious liability theory, as applied to the ESA, is 
controversial and has been criticized by numerous scholars. This Note 
argues that a limited version of the vicarious liability theory is 
consistent with the text of the ESA and plays an essential role in 
fulfilling the promise of the ESA’s take prohibition. As a case study, 
this Note examines how the vicarious liability theory could be used to 
hold the state of Louisiana liable for licensing shrimping gear that 
causes the take of endangered and threatened sea turtles. As illustrated 
by the Louisiana example, the acceptance of a narrowly construed 
vicarious liability theory would protect endangered species without 
placing an unreasonable or unconstitutional burden on state and local 
governments. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1987, the Louisiana legislature passed a law forbidding state 
officials from enforcing federal regulations to protect sea turtles.1 The 
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 1. Act of July 28, 1987, 1987 La. Acts 713 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56:57.2 
(2004)); see infra Part I.B.  
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federal regulations required shrimping vessels to install Turtle 
Excluder Devices (TEDs) in their nets, providing an escape hatch for 
captured sea turtles.2 TEDs save thousands of threatened and 
endangered sea turtles each year from being drowned in shrimp 
trawls in the Gulf of Mexico and along the Atlantic Coast of the 
southeastern United States.3 Louisiana, home to America’s largest 
shrimp fishery,4 is the one state that ignores federal TED 
requirements.5 As of this writing, the federal government has not 
brought enforcement actions against Louisiana, and there is no sign 
that the Louisiana shrimp fishery will end the damage being done to 
the five species of threatened and endangered sea turtles that swim in 
the Gulf waters.6 
This Note argues that Louisiana and other states could be held 
vicariously liable under section 9 of the Endangered Species Act7 
(ESA) when they cause their citizens to take endangered species.8 
The most clear-cut example of a take is when a hunter illegally 
poaches an endangered species. The vicarious liability doctrine, in the 
context of the ESA, allows for the imposition of liability on a state or 
local government for a less direct form of take: when its policies 
authorize others to harm endangered species. Although the vicarious 
 
 2. Sea Turtle Conservation; Shrimp Trawling Requirements, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,244, 24,244 
(June 29, 1987) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 217, 222, 227 (2013)). For an overview of how TEDs 
operate to protect sea turtles, see ScubazooVideo, Turtle Excluder Device (TED) Fitted to a 
Trawl Net To Stop Turtles Drowning, YOUTUBE (June 9, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=y71cgxmyMO4; infra Part I.A. 
 3. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT – SECTION 7 CONSULTATION BIOLOGICAL OPINION 153 (2012), 
available at http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/esa/Fishery%20Biops/SoutheastShrimpBiop_Final.pdf.  
 4. See OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., SHRIMP 
STATISTICS (2013), available at http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/Assets/commercial/market-
news/archives/New-Orleans/2012doc45.zip (collecting statistics, reported monthly, that show 
that Louisiana harvested more pounds of shrimp than any other gulf state in 2009, 2011, and 
2012).  
 5. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 3, at 11; Benjamin Alexander-Bloch, 18 
Shrimp Trawlers Fined over Turtle Excluder Devices, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Nov. 4, 
2011, at B-4. 
 6. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h) (2013) (listing 
endangered and threatened wildlife). 
 7. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 9, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2012). 
 8. The harming or harassing of an endangered species can be referred to as a “take” or a 
“taking.” See, e.g., Paul Boudreaux, Understanding “Take” in the Endangered Species Act, 34 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 733 passim (2002) (discussing the “lack of clarity of the word ‘take’”); Babbitt v. 
Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 passim (1995) (using “taking”). 
This Note typically uses the noun “take,” but both are correct. Part II.A defines “take” in the 
context of the ESA. 
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liability doctrine has faced a skeptical reception in academia, a 
limited vicarious liability doctrine fits with the structure and purpose 
of the ESA. It would also allow for effective enforcement of the take 
prohibition without infringing impermissibly on states’ rights. A large 
number of species could benefit from the application of the ESA’s 
take prohibition to state policies: with vicarious liability as a tool, 
states could be liable for allowing hunters to use lead ammunition, 
which has devastated the endangered California condor population,9 
or licensing fishing gear that harms one of the few remaining northern 
right whales.10 The possible applications of the vicarious liability 
doctrine are vast and could evolve to address threats to species as 
they emerge. 
This Note is the first piece of legal scholarship to present a 
thorough defense of vicarious liability under the ESA. Several 
environmental law scholars have criticized the doctrine, but their 
arguments so far have gone unanswered.11 The vicarious liability 
doctrine could be a valuable tool for the protection of endangered 
species, particularly if applied consistently with the applicable legal 
limitations. In addition, if more courts were to endorse the theory, 
state and local governments would be likely to reconsider policies and 
actions that they know will cause their citizens to harm endangered 
animals. The Louisiana example is a case study of how the vicarious 
liability doctrine could be used to address seemingly intractable 
policies that are having a devastating effect on endangered species. 
In Part I, this Note provides a case study illustrating how a state 
can cause others to harm endangered species. It explains the 
importance of protecting sea turtle populations in the Gulf of Mexico 
and how Louisiana’s refusal to comply with federal TED regulations 
seriously undermines that goal. Part II outlines the development of 
the vicarious liability doctrine and its controversial status in the courts 
and the halls of academia. Part III defines a more limited and 
persuasive formulation of the vicarious liability theory based on the 
common-law distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance. Part 
III also illustrates how this limited version of the doctrine would 
 
 9. Ted Williams, Will Lead Bullets Finally Kill Off the California Condor?, YALE ENV’T 
360 (May 7, 2013), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/will_lead_in_bullets_finally_kill_off_california_
condor/2647.  
 10. See Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 158–71 (1st Cir. 1997) (upholding a district court’s 
finding that Massachusetts commercial fishing regulations qualified as a taking of the northern 
right whale under the ESA).  
 11. See infra Part IV.  
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apply to the Louisiana case. Finally, Part IV explains why the 
vicarious liability doctrine, as applied to the Louisiana case or other 
circumstances, adheres to the language and purpose of the ESA and 
is an important tool for conservation. 
I.  A CASE STUDY: LOUISIANA AND SEA TURTLE PROTECTION 
The ESA, originally passed in 1973, represents a national 
commitment to conserving biodiversity and preventing the extinction 
of wildlife.12 This is a daunting task because animals and plants are 
currently going extinct at least one hundred times faster than the 
natural, background rate of extinction due to human actions.13 Why 
take on such a discouraging challenge? The ESA recognizes that 
endangered and threatened species have “esthetic, ecological, 
educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value.”14 These 
concerns can be expressed as the four “e’s”: species have esthetic, 
ethical, economic, and ecological value.15 
The esthetic value is the enjoyment people get from observing 
and interacting with flora and fauna.16 The ethical value of preserving 
biodiversity comes in many forms, depending on one’s ethics. It could 
be rooted in an inherent “right to exist,”17 or a moral obligation to 
preserve the earth and its natural resources for future generations. 
Some religions, like Christianity, also encourage people to practice 
stewardship over the earth.18 Additionally, biodiversity has an 
economic value: endangered and threatened species can provide 
products used by humans, inform scientific or medical research, and 
contribute to ecosystem services like water filtration, clean air, and 
 
 12. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012)). 
 13. STUART L. PIMM, THE WORLD ACCORDING TO PIMM: A SCIENTIST AUDITS THE 
EARTH 10 (2001). 
 14. Endangered Species Act § 2(a)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3).  
 15. PAUL R. EHRLICH & ANNE EHRLICH, EXTINCTION: THE CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF SPECIES 6 (1981).  
 16. Id. at 38–48; see William M. Flevares, Note, Ecosystems, Economics, and Ethics: 
Protecting Biological Diversity at Home and Abroad, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2039, 2044–46 (1992) 
(describing the recreational and aesthetic values of biodiversity).  
 17. EHRLICH & EHRLICH, supra note 15, at 48–52. 
 18. Kyle S. Van Houtan & Stuart L. Pimm, The Various Christian Ethics of Species 
Conservation, in RELIGION AND THE NEW ECOLOGY: ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY IN A 
WORLD IN FLUX 116, 118, 132–33 (David M. Lodge & Christopher Hamlin eds., 2006). 
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healthy soil.19 In 1997, ecological economist Robert Costanza 
estimated that the ecosystem services on the planet could be valued at 
$33 trillion per year, which was significantly greater than the global 
gross national product of $18 trillion per year.20 Finally, each species 
has ecological value because it is interconnected with its predators, 
prey, competitors, and other aspects of its environment.21 Losing one 
species can create a domino effect in the food chain or alter the 
ecosystem in ways that people may not be able to predict.22 
The argument for protecting sea turtles encompasses all four 
“e’s.” First, sea turtles are greatly admired for their esthetic value, 
and they attract ecotourism in the United States and around the 
world.23 Second, the ethical and moral reasons to protect biodiversity 
generally apply equally to sea turtles. Third, sea turtles provide 
economic benefits in the form of ecotourism, scientific knowledge, 
and ecosystem services. For instance, scientists have studied sea 
turtles’ ability to hold their breath for extended periods of time and 
their navigational skills, with the hope of finding applications for 
human use.24 Fourth, sea turtles play a key ecological role in both the 
marine and beach ecosystems: they help maintain the health of 
seagrass beds, which are essential for other marine species, and bring 
important nutrients onto beaches and dunes.25 It is unlikely that 
people currently understand all of the value that sea turtles may 
provide as a key part of the ecosystem. The drafters of the ESA 
recognized that all forms of life are “potential resources” that “may 
 
 19. See EHRLICH & EHRLICH, supra note 15, at 53–76; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
PERSPECTIVES ON BIODIVERSITY: VALUING ITS ROLE IN AN EVERCHANGING WORLD 43 
(1999).  
 20. Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural 
Capital, 387 NATURE, May 15, 1997, at 253, 253. 
 21. EHRLICH & EHRLICH, supra note 15, at 78–80.  
 22. Id.; see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 48 (explaining how the 
manipulation of the food chain structure can cause ecosystem-wide effects). 
 23. See, e.g., Peter C.H. Pritchard, The Green Turtle: The Most Valuable Reptile in the 
World, in 6 THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S SEA TURTLES REPORT 25, 28 (2011), available at 
http://seaturtlestatus.org/sites/swot/files/report/033111_SWOT6_FinalA.pdf (calling green sea 
turtles “‘the most valuable reptile in the world,’ not in reference to [their] meat, fat, and other 
consumables, but rather to [their] aesthetic value and value for nonconsumptive uses such as 
ecotourism and scientific study”).  
 24. Kathleen Doyle Yaninek, Turtle Excluder Device Regulations: Laws Sea Turtles Can 
Live With, 21 N.C. CENT. L.J. 256, 257 (1995). 
 25. Information About Sea Turtles: Why Care?, SEA TURTLE CONSERVANCY, 
http://www.conserveturtles.org/seaturtleinformation.php?page=whycareaboutseaturtles (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2014).  
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provide answers to questions which we have not yet learned to ask.”26 
Therefore, “[s]heer self-interest impels us to be cautious.”27 
A. The Shrimping Industry’s Impact on Sea Turtles and the Need for 
TEDs 
All five species of sea turtles found in the Gulf of Mexico and 
U.S. Atlantic Ocean are listed under the ESA as threatened or 
endangered.28 The Kemp’s ridley (Lepidochelys kempii), leatherback 
(Dermochelys coriacea), hawksbill (Eretmochelys imbricata), and the 
Florida breeding population of green (Chelonia mydas) sea turtles are 
all endangered,29 whereas the loggerhead (Caretta caretta) and the rest 
of the green sea turtle population are threatened.30 
Sea turtles face a growing number of anthropogenic threats. 
Human presence on beaches, artificial lighting, coastal development, 
beach armoring, and poaching can degrade available nesting sites.31 In 
the ocean, sea turtles are threatened by oil and gas exploration,32 
marine transportation, pollution and debris, offshore artificial lighting 
and development, dredging, military training and detonations, and 
scientific research.33 Additionally, climate change will increasingly 
affect sea turtles by altering their breeding and foraging habitats.34 
Confronting a litany of threats, endangered sea turtles face an uphill 
battle toward recovery.35 
 
 26. H.R. REP. NO. 93-412, at 5 (1973).  
 27. Id. 
 28. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h) (2013). 
 29. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 3, at 29. 
 30. Id.  
 31. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., DRAFT 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT TO REDUCE INCIDENTAL BYCATCH AND MORTALITY 
OF SEA TURTLES IN THE SOUTHEASTERN U.S. SHRIMP FISHERIES 26–27 (2012), available at 
http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/endangered%20species/Shrimp%20Fishery/Sea%20Turtle%20DE
IS.pdf.  
 32. See, e.g., NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 3, at 86–91 (describing the 
potential damage resulting from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in April 2010).  
 33. See id. at 41 (discussing threats from military training and scientific research); see also 
NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 31, at 27 (listing many of the other threats to sea 
turtles). 
 34. See NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 31, at 27–30, 33–34 (indicating that 
climate change could affect sea turtle sex ratios and “decrease available nesting habitat”).  
 35. See NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 3, at 40–43 (laying out in more detail 
the primary threats to loggerhead sea turtles and other sea turtles in the southeastern United 
States and noting that “many of the threats affecting loggerheads are either the same or similar 
in nature to threats affecting other listed sea turtle species”).  
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One of the greatest threats to these species’ survival is fishery 
bycatch.36 In particular, sea turtles face the risk of being captured in 
shrimp trawls, which are open-mouth nets that are pulled through the 
water or dragged along the bottom of the ocean to catch shrimp.37 In 
1990, the National Research Council declared that shrimp trawling 
was the primary source of anthropogenic mortality for sea turtles in 
U.S. waters.38 The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), the 
lead federal agency “responsible for the management, conservation 
and protection of living marine resources” in the United States,39 has 
stated that “[s]outheast[ern] U.S. shrimp fisheries have historically 
been the largest fishery threat” to sea turtles, and these fisheries 
“continue to interact with and kill large numbers of turtles each 
year.”40 Shrimp trawls indiscriminately sweep up any creature that 
falls into the net and is too large to escape through the mesh.41 Sea 
turtles caught in trawls may be injured or killed by forced 
submergence. Although a marine species, sea turtles lack gills and 
must breathe oxygen, so they drown when forced underwater for 
significant periods of time.42 During forced submergence, sea turtles’ 
acid-base balance is disturbed and their oxygen stores deplete more 
rapidly than when they voluntarily submerge; consequently, they 
cannot survive underwater for as long as normal.43 
 
 36. See NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 31, at 54 (“Incidental capture in 
fishery operations remains one of the primary marine anthropogenic mortality sources to 
Atlantic sea turtle populations.”). 
 37. LA. DEP’T OF WILDLIFE AND FISHERIES, LOUISIANA TRAWL GEAR 
CHARACTERIZATION 1-1 to 1-3, available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/strategy/
la_trawl_gear.pdf.  
 38. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DECLINE OF THE SEA TURTLES: CAUSES AND 
PREVENTION 75–76 (1990). For an overview of the potential threat to sea turtles caused by trawl 
fisheries, see generally E. GRIFFIN, K.L. MILLER, S. HARRIS & D. ALLISON, OCEANA, 
TROUBLE FOR TURTLES: TRAWL FISHING IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN AND GULF OF MEXICO 
(2008), available at http://oceana.org/sites/default/files/reports/Trouble4Turtles_WebFinal1.pdf.  
 39. About National Marine Fisheries Service, NOAA FISHERIES, http://www.nmfs.noaa.
gov/aboutus/aboutus.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2014).  
 40. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 3, at 41. 
 41. See GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 38, at 2 (“While the shrimp fishery is one of the most 
economically significant trawl fisheries, the gear also targets a variety of other species, including 
flounder, scallop, scup, black sea bass, groundfish, Atlantic croaker, mackerel, weakfish, squid 
and conch.”).  
 42. Yaninek, supra note 24, at 258. 
 43. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 31, at 106.  
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TEDs can be installed in shrimp trawls to provide a life-saving 
escape hatch for captured turtles.44 For many years, sea turtle 
interactions with shrimp trawls were declining due to TED 
regulations and a reduction in the amount of shrimp trawling 
occurring in the Gulf of Mexico,45 but in 2010 and 2011 there was a 
large spike in the number of dead or injured sea turtles discovered 
and reported by government observers and private individuals.46 
Necropsy results suggested that many of the mortalities resulted from 
drowning, which is characteristic of fishery interactions47 and led 
NMFS to conclude that “sea turtles may be affected by shrimp 
trawling to an extent not previously considered.”48 NMFS estimates 
that there are 494,272 interactions each year between sea turtles and 
the most common type of shrimp trawl—the “otter trawl”—used in 
offshore waters.49 Of these, roughly 51,605 are fatal.50 Because nearly 
half of all shrimp landings are in Louisiana, a large portion of sea 
turtle mortalities most likely occur in Louisiana waters.51 
To address the major threat to sea turtle populations posed by 
shrimp trawling, NMFS began testing TEDs in 1978.52 In 1987, NMFS 
enacted regulations requiring TEDs in most types of shrimp trawls 
twenty-five feet or longer.53 These regulations apply to all U.S. and 
state waters in the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean, from 
 
 44. Sean Skaggs, Sea Turtles and Turtle Excluder Devices: A Review of Recent Events, 14 
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 27, 29 (1990).  
 45. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 3, at 77.  
 46. Id. at 126–27. Dead or injured sea turtles are typically spotted on beaches or in the 
ocean, and are recorded as “strandings” by the Sea Turtle Stranding and Salvage Network 
(STSSN). See id. (documenting the “elevated sea turtle strandings in the Northern Gulf of 
Mexico” over these two years). STSSN then publicly reports the stranding data. See Sea Turtle 
Stranding and Salvage Network (STSSN), NOAA, http://www.sefsc.noaa.gov/species/
turtles/strandings.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2014). Strandings are often the only available sea 
turtle mortality data, but they represent only 5–28 percent of sea turtle deaths, since many turtle 
carcasses are carried out to sea, sink, or are consumed by predators. See NAT’L MARINE 
FISHERIES SERV., supra note 3, at 142–43 (“Because of oceanic conditions (i.e., currents, waves, 
wind) and the dynamic nature of the marine environment, it is likely that stranding records 
actually represent only a small number of the total at-sea mortalities.”).  
 47. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 3, at 77–78.  
 48. Id. at 88.  
 49. Id. at 13, 153 tbl.33.  
 50. Id. at 153 tbl.33. 
 51. See OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH., supra note 4 (showing that in 2013 Louisiana shrimpers 
caught over fifty percent of the pounds of shrimp caught in the Gulf States).  
 52. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 3, at 253; Skaggs, supra note 44, at 28–29.  
 53. Sea Turtle Conservation; Shrimp Trawling Requirements, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,244 (June 29, 
1987) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 217, 222, 227 (2013)).  
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Florida to the northern boundary of North Carolina.54 Due to legal 
challenges and political backlash, the full implementation of TED 
requirements did not begin until sometime between 1992 and 1994.55 
Some specific gear types (most notably skimmer trawls) and smaller 
shrimp trawls56 are still exempt from the TED requirements if they 
follow tow-time restrictions, which are an alternative method of 
protecting sea turtles by limiting the amount of time that trawls can 
remain submerged.57 NMFS recently considered, but ultimately 
rejected, a new rule that would require TEDs on skimmer trawls as 
well, noting that compliance with tow-time restrictions was low and 
much shorter forced submerges were harming sea turtles than 
previously believed.58 Studies show that even when shrimpers comply 
with alternative tow-time restrictions, turtles will still be killed by 
forced submergence.59 Additionally, tow-time restrictions are not 
appropriate for all shrimp trawls: they have only been applied to 
types of gear that practically require the nets to be raised with some 
frequency.60 
 
 54. 50 C.F.R. § 222.102 (2013).  
 55. See NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 3, at 254 (“A chaotic array of 
lawsuits, injunctions, suspensions of law enforcement, legislative actions by several states, 
legislation by Congress, and temporary rules issued by NMFS and the Department of 
Commerce follows the initial effective date of the 1987 regulations. The result is a patchwork of 
times and areas where TEDs are and are not required/enforced.”). See generally Skaggs, supra 
note 44 (describing the events that transpired in the three years after the enactment of the 1987 
regulations to delay implementation of TED requirements).  
 56. For a list of exempted vessels, see Exceptions to Prohibitions Relating to Sea Turtles, 
50 C.F.R. § 223.206(d)(2)(ii) (2013).  
 57. Tow-time restrictions are put in place with the hope that shrimpers will raise their nets 
and release any sea turtles before they drown. Shrimping vessels that choose to use TEDs have 
no time limits on their trawls. For more information on skimmer trawls and alternative tow-time 
restrictions, see NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 31, at 3–5.  
 58. Sea Turtle Conservation; Shrimp Trawling Requirements, 77 Fed. Reg. 27,411, 27,411–
12 (proposed May 10, 2012) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 233); see also NAT’L MARINE 
FISHERIES SERV., supra note 31, at 4, 14, 108 (providing evidence that the current tow-time 
restrictions still lead to sea turtle mortalities).  NMFS withdrew the proposed rule in February 
2013, concluding that the benefits to sea turtles did not justify the economic costs to shrimp 
fishermen. Sea Turtle Conservation; Shrimp Trawling Requirements, 78 Fed. Reg. 9024, 9024–
26 (Feb. 7, 2013).  
 59. See, e.g., Christopher R. Sasso & Sheryan P. Epperly, Seasonal Sea Turtle Mortality 
Risk from Forced Submergence in Bottom Trawls, 81 FISHERIES RES. 86, 86–88 (2006) (reporting 
sea turtle deaths after only ten minutes of forced submergence, despite tow-time restrictions of 
fifty-five minutes).  
 60. See NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 3, at 9 (noting that tow-time 
restrictions “are for gears or fishing practices that, at least historically, out of physical, practical, 
or economic necessity, were thought to require fishermen to limit their tow times naturally”). 
DAMIANO IN PP (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2014 8:27 PM 
1552 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1543 
NMFS calculates that approved, properly installed TEDs allow 
95–98 percent of sea turtles to escape from the trawls61 and result in 
minimal loss of shrimp.62 Based on this calculation, the consistent use 
of TEDs in the Louisiana shrimp fishery would save thousands of 
endangered and threatened sea turtles each year63 and help species, 
like the highly endangered Kemp’s ridley sea turtle, continue to 
recover from the brink of extinction.64 
B. Louisiana’s Resistance to TEDs 
When the federal government first proposed TED requirements 
for certain shrimp trawlers in 1987, Louisiana shrimpers reacted with 
extreme hostility.65 Shrimpers oppose the requirements based on cost: 
NMFS estimates that installing and maintaining TEDs in two nets 
may cost shrimp fishermen over $2,000 in the first year.66  This cost is 
significant to fishermen in an industry that is already struggling.67  
With the encouragement of the shrimp industry, the Louisiana state 
legislature passed a law forbidding the use of state funds to enforce 
 
 61. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 31, at 5. But see Memorandum from 
Miyoko Sakashita, Oceans Dir., Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Marydele Donnelly, Dir. of Int’l 
Policy, Sea Turtle Conservancy, Elizabeth Wilson, Senior Manager for Marine Wildlife, 
Oceana, Christopher Pincetich, Campaigner and Marine Biologist, Sea Turtle Restoration 
Project, Sierra B. Weaver, Senior Staff Attorney, Defenders of Wildlife, to Michael Barnette, 
Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., RE: Comments on the Scope of the Fisheries Service’s 
Environmental Impact Statement for Sea Turtle Conservation and Recovery Actions 9–11 
(Aug. 8, 2011) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (raising concerns about the effectiveness of 
TEDs because of unrealistic testing protocols and inadequate compliance). 
 62. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 31, at 167 (estimating that TEDs cause a 
5 percent reduction in shrimp harvest).  
 63. See supra notes 29–51 and accompanying text.  
 64. TEDs come with other benefits as well. TEDs reduce the unwanted bycatch of fish, 
which protects species such as the endangered Gulf sturgeon and lessens the “serious waste of 
fishery resources” associated with large bycatch. See Yaninek, supra note 24, at 270 (explaining 
that “shrimpers kill and waste 2.5 billion pounds of fish a year” through bycatch, “70 percent of 
which would have been commercially valuable if allowed to mature”); see also NAT’L MARINE 
FISHERIES SERV., supra note 31, at 68 (noting that bycatch of Gulf sturgeon has been mitigated 
by TEDs and Bycatch Reduction Devices).  
 65. See Cain Burdeau, Scientists Urge La. To Protect Netted Sea Turtles, HUNTSVILLE 
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2011, at 04C (“Louisiana’s fishermen were outraged by the new devices . . . .”).  
 66. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 31, at 167–68 (calculating the cost of 
purchasing and maintaining TEDs and analyzing the reduction in profits for Gulf fisheries, 
including those in Louisiana).  
 67. See id. at 167 (estimating that this cost would be approximately 9.4 percent of a 
Louisiana shrimp fisherman’s average annual shrimp revenue).  
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any future federal TED requirements in Louisiana waters.68 The law 
asserts “the imposition of TEDs on Louisiana shrimpers is unjustified, 
inequitable, and unworkable,” and questions the evidence that shrimp 
trawling harms turtles.69 
The law also directs Louisiana’s attorney general to “file a class 
action suit . . . to enjoin the implementation” of any TED 
regulations.70 Thus, after NMFS adopted the final rule,71 the state of 
Louisiana and the Concerned Shrimpers of Louisiana challenged the 
regulation in federal court as a violation of the Administrative 
Procedure Act72 and the constitutional guarantees of equal protection 
and due process.73 The district court upheld the TED regulations.74 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed,75 finding that “[t]he relationship of 
shrimping to sea turtle mortality is strongly demonstrated by data 
contained in the administrative record.”76 It held that it was not 
arbitrary for Congress to determine that the “‘incalculable’ value of 
genetic heritage” outweighed the cost and inconvenience that would 
be placed on the Louisiana shrimp industry.77 Undeterred, Louisiana 
sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the implementation of the 
regulations; this effort was also unsuccessful.78 
Meanwhile, every other Gulf state has formed an agreement with 
NMFS to enforce TED regulations in exchange for the necessary 
funds and resources.79 Conservation groups have lobbied Louisiana’s 
legislature and governor with information demonstrating the need for 
TEDs.80 In June 2010, the Louisiana legislature unanimously passed a 
bill that would have repealed the law and enabled state officials to 
 
 68. Act of July 28, 1987, 1987 La. Acts 713 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56:57.2 
(2004)).  
 69. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56:57.2(A)(1). 
 70. Id. § 56:57.2(D). 
 71. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.  
 72. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012). 
 73. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. Verity, 681 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (E.D. La. 1988), aff’d, 853 
F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 74. See id. at 1185 (granting summary judgment for the defendants).  
 75. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. Verity, 853 F.2d 322, 334 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 76. Id. at 327. 
 77. Id. at 331 (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 179 (1978)). 
 78. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. Mosbacher, No. 89-1899, 1989 WL 87616, at *5–6 (E.D. La. 
Aug. 1, 1989).  
 79. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 3, at 11; Alexander-Bloch, supra note 5. 
 80. Janet McConnaughey, Groups: Repeal Law Against Trap Door in Shrimp Nets, 
HUNTSVILLE TIMES, Feb. 7, 2012, at 04C.  
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enforce TED regulations.81 Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal vetoed 
the bill, expressing concern for Louisiana shrimpers after the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, which had occurred just two months 
earlier.82 As of this writing, the Louisiana law still stands, and 
Governor Jindal has not shown any sign of reversing his position.83 
C. Political and Legal Options To Overcome Louisiana’s Refusal To 
Comply with TED Regulations 
There are several possible strategies that could be employed to 
increase the use of TEDs in the Louisiana shrimp fishery. First, the 
Louisiana legislature could repeal the law again, although it may 
continue to face Governor Jindal’s veto until his term ends in 2016. 
The legislature can override a veto with the support of two-thirds of 
its members;84 however, it did not do so in 2010. 
Congress could also step in. Although it cannot require the states 
to enforce federal laws,85 Congress could condition certain funding on 
the state’s enforcement of TED regulations.86 This is improbable, 
however, because the current Republican-led U.S. House of 
Representatives is unlikely to support measures to strengthen the 
ESA, particularly through increased spending.87 Furthermore, other 
 
 81. H.R. 1334, 2010 Reg. Sess. (La. 2010); see Votes, LA. ST. LEGISLATURE, 
http://www.legis.la.gov/legis/BillDocs.aspx?i=216366&t=votes (last visited Feb. 23, 2014) 
(providing the history of the legislation, including the vote record of 92–0 in the Louisiana 
House of Representatives and 34–0 in the Louisiana Senate).  
 82. Letter from Bobby Jindal, Governor of La., to Alfred W. Speer, Clerk of the House, 
La. House of Representatives (June 29, 2010), available at http://legis.la.gov/archive/
10RS/veto/HB1334v.pdf. 
 83. Several environmental groups have encouraged Governor Jindal to support a repeal. A 
group of twenty-six environmental groups sent a letter to the governor in 2012 with that 
message. Their letter has gone unanswered. McConnuaghey, supra note 80. 
 84. LA. CONST. art. 3, § 18(C).  
 85. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (“[E]ven where Congress has 
the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks 
the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.”). 
 86. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206, 207–08 (1987) (allowing Congress to issue 
spending conditions that it could not impose directly through legislation, and defining the 
constitutional limits on those conditions).  
 87. See Endangered Species Act, COMMITTEE ON NAT. RESOURCES, 
http://naturalresources.house.gov/issues/issue/?IssueID=5923 (last visited Feb. 23, 2014) (stating 
the opinion of the committee’s Republican majority that the ESA “is failing to achieve its 
primary purpose of species recovery and instead has become a tool for litigation that drains 
resources away from real recovery efforts and blocks job-creating economic activities,” and 
detailing some of the majority’s efforts to reform the law). See generally MINORITY STAFF, 
COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE ANTI-
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Gulf states have agreements with NMFS to enforce TED regulations 
in exchange for funding,88 and Louisiana has not shown interest in a 
similar agreement. 
Many environmental advocates hope that NMFS will play a more 
active role in correcting Louisiana’s noncompliance.89 NMFS could 
use federal officials to enforce the regulations itself, but effective 
enforcement throughout the Louisiana shrimp fishery would be 
expensive and challenging.90 NMFS could also severely restrict or 
even shut down Louisiana’s shrimp fishery, if that was necessary to 
protect sea turtles.91 However, the shrimp industry plays a significant 
role in Louisiana’s economy; shutting down the fishery could lead to 
serious economic damage and political backlash.92 
Finally, environmental groups could pursue litigation. For 
example, they could sue NMFS for failing in its duty to protect sea 
turtles.93 Groups also could bring suit against individual shrimp 
 
ENVIRONMENT RECORD OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 112TH CONGRESS (2013), 
available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Anti-
Environment-Voting-Record-of-112th-Congress-Summary-Final.pdf (listing over three hundred 
votes taken by Republican members of Congress that could be harmful to the environment).  
 88. Alexander-Bloch, supra note 5. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See Jean O. Melious, Enforcing the Endangered Species Act Against the States, 25 WM. 
& MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 605, 608 (2001) (“Federal enforcement efforts are limited by 
budget, by politics, and by the fact that federal interests may not be concurrent with private 
interests.”). 
 91. NMFS has the power to create Fishery Management Plans based on what it concludes 
is “necessary and appropriate for the conservation and management of the fishery.” Magnuson-
Stevens Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(1)(A) (2012). These plans must be “consistent with the 
national standards” adopted in the Magnuson-Stevens Act and comply with “any other 
applicable law,” including the ESA. Id. § 1853(a)(1)(C). For instance, in 2002 NMFS effectively 
shut down the swordfish fishery and placed strict limits on fishing for other pelagic fish to 
protect endangered and threatened sea turtles. Fisheries off West Coast States and in the 
Western Pacific; Western Pacific Pelagic Fisheries; Pelagic Longline Gear Restrictions, Seasonal 
Area Closure, and Other Sea Turtle Take Mitigation Measures, 67 Fed. Reg. 40,232 (June 12, 
2002) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 660), invalidated by Haw. Longline Ass’n v. Nat’l Marine 
Fisheries Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2003). Although a district court invalidated the 
regulation for relying on a faulty Biological Opinion, it did not deny NMFS’s authority to close 
the fishery. Haw. Longline Ass’n, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 37–38.  
 92. See LA. DEP’T OF WILDLIFE & FISHERIES, THE LOUISIANA SHRIMP INDUSTRY: A 
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE INDUSTRY’S SECTORS 6 (2000), available at 
http://www.wlf.louisiana.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/publication/32730-louisiana-shrimp-
industry/la._shrimp_industry.pdf (“As an industry, the harvesting, handling, processing, 
distribution, and retailing of shrimp provides a significant contribution to the state’s 
economy.”).  
 93. For example, a case against NMFS led to the proposed rule to require TEDs on 
skimmer trawls. Settlement Agreement and Stipulation of Dismissal, Turtle Island Restoration 
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fishermen who violate the ESA’s section 9 take provision.94 Though 
this might encourage shrimp fishermen to comply with TED 
regulations voluntarily, holding a few individuals responsible would 
be costly and would not necessarily lead to systemic changes in the 
Louisiana shrimp fishery. 
The political and practical barriers to addressing Louisiana’s 
harmful policies are typical of the threats that face endangered 
species.95 There may not be political will to face the strong private 
interests opposing endangered species protection. Additionally, it 
may be hard to track down individuals who directly cause each take.96 
Many endangered species are killed by poachers, hunters, trappers, 
and fishermen, often in forests or the open ocean.97 These takes are 
rarely witnessed by someone other than the perpetrator, and thus are 
unlikely to be reported. Other species are killed by humans in more 
indirect ways, which can be even harder to accurately trace.98  Finally, 
the federal government’s budget and resource constraints prevent it 
from addressing many serious threats to species.99 
Lawsuits against the state of Louisiana and others like it provide 
an attractive means of protecting endangered species from harmful 
state policies. Through such a lawsuit, advocates could secure 
injunctions that prevent a state’s ongoing licensure of unlawful 
practices or place pressure on a state to voluntarily change course. To 
 
Network v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 1:11-cv-01813-ABJ (D.D.C. Apr. 26, 2012); 
Conservationists Win New Shrimping Rules To Prevent Sea Turtles from Drowning in Fishing 
Nets, YUBANET.COM (May 9, 2012, 7:20 AM) http://yubanet.com/usa/Conservationists-Win-
New-Shrimping-Rules-to-Prevent-Sea-Turtles-from-Drowning-in-Fishing-Nets.php.  
 94. See Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 9, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2012).  
 95. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.  
 96. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.  
 97. See Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429, 439 (5th Cir. 1991) (addressing logging 
activities’ interactions with red-cockaded woodpeckers); Animal Prot. Inst. v. Holsten, 541 F. 
Supp. 2d 1073, 1081 (D. Minn. 2008) (noting that the endangered Canada lynx is often caught in 
hunting traps); Notice of a Firearm Shooting Restriction on Public Lands Within the Red 
Mountain Polygon, San Bernardino County, CA, 67 Fed. Reg. 30,396 (May 6, 2002) (restricting 
gun use in the Mojave Desert because large numbers of endangered Desert Tortoises were 
found shot to death).  
 98. See Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 F.2d 1294, 1296–97 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting that 
pesticides applied by farmers could kill nontarget species, such as the endangered black-footed 
ferret); Aransas Project v. Shaw, 930 F. Supp. 2d 716, 787 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (finding a take of 
whooping cranes because water withdrawals damaged their habitat and prevented them from 
feeding). 
 99. For one of many accounts of the budget problems faced by the FWS and NMFS, see 
Josh Pollock, Saving Endangered Wildlife: Federal Law Works, but Program Is Underfunded, 
DENVER POST, Apr. 1, 2007, at 1E.  
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prevail, however, the litigants would have to show that Louisiana is 
vicariously liable for the takes committed by the shrimpers. 
II.  THE VICARIOUS LIABILITY DOCTRINE’S ROOTS AND BRANCHES 
This Note explores the possibility of a vicarious liability suit 
against Louisiana and states that similarly cause people to take 
endangered species. Vicarious liability is a familiar concept in many 
areas of the law.100 In the context of the ESA, the vicarious liability 
doctrine has been used to hold state and local governments liable for 
causing others to take endangered or threatened species.101 This Part 
will briefly describe the basic structure of the ESA and the textual 
basis for the vicarious liability doctrine, and then it will trace the 
development of the theory through key court cases. 
A. The ESA and the Take Prohibition 
This Section will outline the ESA provisions most relevant to 
vicarious liability: sections 4, 7, 9, 10, and 11.102 The ESA is “the most 
comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species 
ever enacted by any nation.”103 Through the ESA, “Congress has 
spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the 
balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the 
highest of priorities.”104 
Protecting endangered species begins with section 4 of the ESA, 
which establishes guidelines for the listing of endangered and 
threatened species and their critical habitats.105 The ESA defines an 
 
 100. See, e.g., Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003) (applying vicarious liability in the 
context of the Fair Housing Act and stating that “when Congress creates a tort action, it 
legislates against a legal background of ordinary tort-related vicarious liability rules and 
consequently intends its legislation to incorporate those rules”). See generally Catherine Fisk & 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Without Remedies: Vicarious Liability Under Title VII, Section 
1983, and Title IX, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 755 (1999) (explaining vicarious liability’s 
application under Civil Rights statutes); Daniel J. Koevary, Note, Automobile Leasing and the 
Vicarious Liability of Lessors, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 655 (2005) (critiquing a New York law 
that made lessors vicariously liable for torts committed by their lessees).  
 101. See infra Part II.B.  
 102. For a more thorough overview of the ESA, see generally DALE D. GOBLE & ERIC T. 
FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1166–1349 (2002).  
 103. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).  
 104. Id. at 194.  
 105. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2012). “Critical habitat” also must be officially listed. It is defined as 
“the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the species . . . on which are found 
those physical or biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the species and (II) 
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“endangered species” as “any species which is in danger of extinction 
throughout all or a significant portion of its range,”106 and a 
“threatened species” as “any species which is likely to become an 
endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a 
significant portion of its range.”107 Once a species is listed, based on 
the statutory criteria,108 the protective provisions of the ESA apply, 
and the Departments of Interior and Commerce are required to issue 
regulations to protect the species.109 
Section 7 places affirmative duties on federal agencies110 and 
requires them to consult with the federal government whenever an 
agency action “is likely to jeopardize the continued existence” of a 
listed species.111 The consulting agency is either the Fish and Wildlife 
Service (FWS), for most land animals, or NMFS, for most marine 
animals. For the purpose of clarity, this Note will refer to them 
interchangeably as “the Services.” The substantive requirement to 
consult with the Services applies only to federal agencies, not to 
private individuals or states. If one of the Services determines that the 
proposed action is “likely to adversely affect any listed species or 
critical habitat,” it will initiate formal consultation112 culminating in a 
Biological Opinion (BiOp). A BiOp surveys the environmental 
impacts of the action and recommends “reasonable and prudent 
alternatives” to reduce the harm to endangered and threatened 
species.113 
The vicarious liability doctrine arises out of section 9 of the ESA, 
which makes it unlawful for any person to take an endangered 
species.114 To “take” means “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, 
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any 
 
which may require special management considerations or protection” or other lands that are 
“essential for the conservation of the species.” Id. §§ 1532(5)(A)(i)–(ii).  
 106. Id. § 1532(6). 
 107. Id. § 1532(20). As shorthand, this Note primarily refers to “endangered species.” 
However, unless otherwise noted, the provisions discussed here apply to both threatened and 
endangered species. 
 108. See id. § 1533(a)(1) (laying out the five factors to be considered in any listing decision).  
 109. Id. § 1533(d). 
 110. See id. § 1536(a)(1) (“Federal agencies shall . . . utilize their authorities in furtherance 
of the purposes of this chapter by carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered 
species and threatened species . . . .”). 
 111. Id. §§ 1536(a)(2), (4). 
 112. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 (2013).  
 113. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A). 
 114. Id. §§ 1538(a)(1)(B)–(C).  
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such conduct.”115 To “harass” is further defined as “an intentional or 
negligent act or omission which creates the likelihood of injury to 
wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt 
normal behavioral patterns.”116 “Harm” is “an act which actually kills 
or injures wildlife,” including those indirectly causing death or injury 
through habitat modification or degradation.117 Section 9 prohibits the 
take of endangered species, and the Department of Commerce has 
extended the prohibition to threatened species through regulations.118 
“Take” is broadly defined to encompass a wide range of 
actions.119 Section 9 makes it unlawful for a person either to directly 
take a protected animal or “to attempt to commit, solicit another to 
commit, or cause to be committed” a take of an endangered species.120 
Additionally, “person” is broadly defined as 
an individual, corporation, partnership, trust, association, or any 
other private entity; or any officer, employee, agent, department, or 
instrumentality of the Federal Government, of any State, 
municipality, or political subdivision of a State, or of any foreign 
government; any State, municipality, or political subdivision of a 
State; or any other entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States.121 
These provisions combine to form the basis for vicarious liability: it is 
unlawful for a state to cause another to commit a take. 
It is important to note that the take prohibition is not absolute. 
Under section 10, any person may apply to the Services for an 
Incidental Take Permit (ITP), which approves certain takes that are 
“incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an 
otherwise lawful activity.”122  Similarly, under section 7, the Services 
can issue an Incidental Take Statement (ITS) as part of a BiOp. An 
 
 115. Id. § 1532(19). 
 116. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3(c).  
 117. Id.  
 118. See id. § 17.31 (issued pursuant to the Department’s authority under 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1533(d)).  
 119. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 704–05 
(1995) (giving examples from the Senate and House reports that supported “the broadest 
possible” meaning for take and upholding the regulatory definition of harm that included 
habitat modification). 
 120. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(g). 
 121. Id. § 1532(13). 
 122. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3(c)(3). The Services must allow public comment on all ITP applications 
and can only approve them according to the conditions laid out in 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B).  
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ITS allows a federal agency to take endangered species during the 
proposed action if the taking will not jeopardize the continued 
existence of any listed species and is incidental to the purpose of the 
action.123 As long as the action is carried out in compliance with the 
specification of the ITS or ITP, the agency will not be liable for a 
take.124 
Despite this exemption, the ESA is one of the most demanding 
and far-reaching environmental laws.125 Section 11 authorizes civil and 
criminal penalties for violations of the ESA,126 and allows for citizen 
suits as a means of enforcement. “[A]ny person may commence a civil 
suit on his own behalf . . . to enjoin any person, including the United 
States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency . . . who 
is alleged to be in violation of” the ESA.127 These suits must 
demonstrate the typical requirements for justiciability, including 
standing.128 Citizen suits have been a critical part of ESA 
enforcement.129 
B. The Vicarious Liability Doctrine in the Text and the Courts 
Under the vicarious liability doctrine, state and local 
governments can be liable under section 9 of the ESA if they 
authorize actions that take federally listed species.130 The theory is 
particularly attractive because of the practical constraints on federal 
 
 123. Id. § 1536(b)(4). 
 124. Id. § 1536(o)(2). 
 125. See, e.g., Patrick Parenteau, Citizen Suits Under the Endangered Species Act: Survival of 
the Fittest, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 321, 321 & n.2 (2004) (repeating the oft-quoted line from the 
late Senator John Chafee, a staunch supporter of the ESA, that the ESA is considered the “pit 
bull of environmental statutes”). 
 126. 16 U.S.C. § 1540. 
 127. Id. § 1540(g)(1). Additionally, citizen suits can be used to “compel the Secretary to 
apply . . . the prohibitions . . . with respect to the taking of any resident endangered species or 
threatened species within any State” or to perform any nondiscretionary duty listed in the ESA. 
Id. 
 128. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (holding that the 
respondents did not have standing because they did not make “the requisite demonstration of 
(at least) injury and redressability”).  
 129. See generally James R. May, Now More than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen 
Suits at 30, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 1 (2003) (explaining the prevalence and importance of citizen 
suits in the enforcement of environmental laws).  
 130. See Jason Totoiu, Building a Better State Endangered Species Act: An Integrated 
Approach Toward Recovery, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,299, 10,322 (2010) (“It is 
when governments have taken affirmative steps to permit, license, or otherwise authorize 
activities that result in the take of listed species that courts have held such regulatory practices 
may also constitute a taking for purposes of §9 of the ESA.”).  
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enforcement of the ESA and the difficulty of catching individual 
violators. One environmentalist explains: 
As a practical matter, enforcing the taking prohibition of the ESA 
against these myriad actors is exceedingly difficult. However, if the 
activities of these actors are subject to regulation by some 
intermediary, such as a city or county government, it may be much 
more practical to influence what the various individual actors do by 
influencing how the intervening regulatory body wields its authority. 
Indeed, if a regulatory body could itself be deemed liable for the 
taking of endangered species by those whose activities it regulates, 
then the practical alternative to enforcing the ESA’s prohibitions 
against thousands of individual actors would be to enforce those 
prohibitions against the regulatory body.131 
The textual basis for vicarious liability is fairly explicit. Section 9 
forbids any person, including “any State, municipality, or political 
subdivision of a State,”132 from “caus[ing] to be committed”133 the take 
of any listed species.134 Therefore, the focus of the contentious debate 
over the use of this doctrine boils down to the word “cause.” Critics 
of vicarious liability under the ESA argue that state or local 
governments135 cannot legally cause a take through their policies or 
the issuance of licenses or permits.136 There is nothing in the ESA text 
or in the common-law understanding of causation that supports an 
exception for this certain type of causal action. If the government 
action satisfies the “ordinary requirements of proximate causation 
and foreseeability,” it is a legal cause of take and is prohibited by 
section 9.137 
The vicarious liability doctrine is not merely theoretical; courts 
have endorsed it in varying forms. The early roots of the doctrine can 
be found in Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural 
 
 131. Michael J. Bean, Major Endangered Species Act Developments in 2000, 31 ENVTL. L. 
REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,283, 10,285 (2001). 
 132. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13). 
 133. Id. § 1538(g).  
 134. Id. § 1538(a)(1).  
 135. This Note mainly refers to states, both as shorthand and because of the case study 
proposing a suit against the state of Louisiana. Most of the commentary would apply equally to 
local governments.  
 136. See infra Part III.B.  
 137. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 700 n.13 
(1995). 
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Resources (Palila I),138 which held that the state of Hawaii was liable 
for indirectly causing the take of the palila, an endangered bird.139 
Hawaii’s game management program introduced feral goats and 
sheep into the palila habitat.140 These animals damaged the plant life 
that was essential for the palila population.141 Even though Hawaii’s 
action did not directly harm the birds, the Ninth Circuit found that it 
still had a “prohibited impact on an endangered species.”142 The court 
ordered the state to remove all feral goats and sheep from the palila 
habitat.143 Eight years later, in Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land 
and Natural Resources (Palila II),144 the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed this 
reasoning in a similar case, holding Hawaii liable for introducing 
mouflon sheep into the palila habitat.145 
The Fifth Circuit applied similar reasoning in Sierra Club v. 
Yeutter,146 in which environmental groups challenged the U.S. Forest 
Service’s tree-harvesting methods that were harming the habitat of 
the endangered red-cockaded woodpecker.147 The Fifth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s holding that the Forest Service’s policy 
resulted in a take of the woodpecker and therefore violated section 9 
of the ESA.148 
Moving the doctrine a step further, Defenders of Wildlife v. 
EPA149 is considered the first true example of the vicarious liability 
 
 138. Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land & Natural Res. (Palila I), 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).  
 139. Id. at 498. 
 140. Id. at 496.  
 141. Id. at 495–96.  
 142. Id. at 497. 
 143. Id. at 496. 
 144. Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land & Natural Res. (Palila II), 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 145. Id. at 1110.  
 146. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429, 439 (5th Cir. 1991). Yeutter is particularly 
important for the purposes of the analysis in this Note because it is binding Fifth Circuit 
precedent, and the Fifth Circuit would most likely have jurisdiction over a case against 
Louisiana. 
 147. Id. at 432. 
 148. Id. at 439. The court also found that the U.S. Forest Service had violated section 7, 
which applies only to federal agencies, because they had not ensured that their action was not 
“‘likely to jeopardize the continued existence of’” the woodpecker. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1536(a)(2) (2012)). Some critics of the vicarious liability doctrine have argued that the section 
9 holding was irrelevant and the court should have issued the injunction solely under section 7. 
J.B. Ruhl, State and Local Government Vicarious Liability Under the ESA, NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENV’T, Fall 2001, at 70, 71.  
 149. Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1989).  
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doctrine.150 Previous cases, like Yeutter, held the government liable for 
a take when its policies caused government actors to modify habitat 
on federal lands;151 Defenders for the first time held the government 
liable for actions of independent third parties on private lands.152 The 
court held that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) violated 
section 9 of the ESA by registering pesticides containing strychnine, 
and thus allowing farmers to legally use them.153 The court found that 
the EPA’s registration of the pesticides was “critical to the resulting 
poisonings of endangered species” and therefore “constituted takings 
of endangered species.”154 The causal chain in Defenders consisted of 
three steps: (1) the government authorized the use of strychnine 
pesticides, (2) farmers chose to use those pesticides, and (3) the 
pesticides killed animals, including the endangered black-footed 
ferret.155 Despite the necessary involvement of a third party (the 
farmers), the court found that “[t]he relationship between the 
registration decision and the deaths of endangered species is clear.”156 
The next step in this line of cases is the quintessential vicarious 
liability case, Strahan v. Coxe,157 and the one most comparable on the 
facts to Louisiana’s licensing of shrimping vessels without TEDs. In 
Coxe, whale enthusiast Max Strahan158 brought a suit against 
environmental agencies in Massachusetts for issuing fishing permits to 
commercial fishing vessels that used gillnets and lobster pots, gear 
that had entangled northern right whales on several occasions.159 
 
 150. See Valerie J.M. Brader, Shell Games: Vicarious Liability for State and Local 
Governments for Insufficiently Protective Regulations Under the ESA, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 
103, 105 (2005) (“This case was the first circuit court case to make the jump from liability for 
governmental actions taken as the owner and manager of public property to liability for third-
party actions.”).  
 151. Yeutter, 926 F.2d at 439. 
 152. Defenders, 882 F.2d at 1301. 
 153. Id. at 1296, 1300. The pesticides were registered pursuant to the EPA’s authority under 
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136a (2012). Like Yeutter, 
Defenders also held the agency’s action illegal under both section 7 and section 9. Defenders, 
882 F.2d at 1296, 1300; see supra note 148. 
 154. Defenders, 882 F.2d at 1301.  
 155. Id. at 1297. 
 156. Id. at 1301. 
 157. Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997). For purposes of clarity, this case will be 
referred to in short form as “Coxe” because environmental activist Max Strahan has been a 
party in several ESA suits.  
 158. For an interesting account of Strahan’s colorful and controversial efforts to protect 
whales, see Carey Goldberg, A Boston Firebrand Alienates His Allies Even as He Saves Whales, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1999, at A9. 
 159. Coxe, 127 F.3d at 158–59. 
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Although NMFS had not banned those gear types, it had recognized 
that entanglement with fishing gear was the leading threat to the 
highly endangered northern right whale and had issued an interim 
final rule to restrict their use.160 
The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, finding 
that “a governmental third party pursuant to whose authority an actor 
directly exacts a taking of an endangered species may be deemed to 
have violated the provisions of the ESA.”161 The court relied on the 
explicit language of section 9, stating that causing a take to be 
committed counts as a violation of the ESA.162  “[W]hen read 
together,” these provisions prohibit “acts by third parties that allow 
or authorize acts that exact a taking and that, but for the permitting 
process, could not take place.”163 Although the defendant state 
agencies argued that the government regulatory scheme did not 
“cause” the take according to the typical common law interpretation 
of causation,164 the court held that “the ‘indirect causation’ of a taking 
by the Commonwealth through its licensing scheme” is within “the 
normal boundaries” of causation.165 
The defendants in Coxe analogized Massachusetts’s actions to 
the licensing of automobiles, a metaphor that has been influential and 
oft-cited in vicarious liability cases and scholarship.166 The defendants 
argued that “the Commonwealth’s licensure of a generally permitted 
activity does not cause the taking any more than its licensure of 
automobiles and drivers solicits or causes federal crimes;”167 it is the 
individual driver’s choice to operate the car in an illegal way by using 
 
 160. Id. at 159, 162 (citing Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing 
Operations; Atlantic Large Whale Take Reduction Plan Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 39,157 (July 
22, 1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 229)).  
 161. Id. at 163. 
 162. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B), (g) (1994)).  
 163. Id. 
 164. See id. (“The defendants argue that . . . state licensure activity . . . cannot be a 
‘proximate cause’ of the taking.”). 
 165. Id. 
 166. See, e.g., Strahan v. Linnon, No. 97-1787, 1998 WL 1085817, at *4 (1st Cir. July 16, 
1998) (per curiam) (holding that the U.S. Coast Guard was not liable for takes caused by “non-
Coast Guard vessels that it permits to operate” because the program was “analogous to the 
licensure of automobiles”); Ruhl, supra note 148, at 73 (discussing the automobile-licensing 
metaphor in his critique of Coxe).  
 167. Coxe, 127 F.3d at 163. 
DAMIANO IN PP (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2014 8:27 PM 
2014] A DEFENSE OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY 1565 
it to traffic drugs or rob a bank.168 The court rejected this analogy, 
stating: 
“[W]hereas it is possible for a person licensed by Massachusetts to 
use a car in a manner that does not risk the violations of federal law 
suggested by the defendants, it is not possible for a licensed 
commercial fishing operation to use its gillnets or lobster pots in the 
manner permitted by the Commonwealth without risk of violating 
the ESA by exacting a taking.”169  
In the car example, “the violation of federal law is caused only by 
the actor’s conscious and independent decision to disregard or go 
beyond the licensed purposes of her automobile use.”170 With the 
fishing gear, “the state has licensed commercial fishing 
operations . . . in specifically the manner that is likely to result in a 
violation of federal law.”171 Therefore, the court found that “the 
state’s licensure of gillnet and lobster pot fishing does not involve the 
intervening independent actor” that is necessary for the car analogy 
to work.172 
The Coxe holding was taken a step further in Loggerhead Turtle 
v. County Council,173 in which the plaintiffs challenged the decision of 
Volusia County, Florida, to allow beach driving and beachfront 
artificial lighting, which harmed nesting loggerhead and green sea 
turtles and hatchlings.174 After the case began, Volusia County 
petitioned the FWS for an ITP, and one was granted for takes 
resulting from beach driving.175 The Eleventh Circuit held that the ITP 
did not extend to the takes caused by the lighting176 and determined 
that there was “a sufficient causal connection to seek to hold Volusia 
County liable for ‘harmfully’ inadequate regulation of artificial 
beachfront lighting.”177 The court held that the causal connection was 
sufficient for standing purposes, but did not reach the causation 
 
 168. Id. at 164.  
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. But see Totoiu, supra note 130, at 10,323 (arguing that the distinction between the 
two licensing schemes is that a state has no discretion to deny automobile licenses, but does 
have the discretion to deny a fishing permit). 
 172. Coxe, 127 F.3d at 164.  
 173. Loggerhead Turtle v. Cnty. Council, 148 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 174. Id. at 1235–36. 
 175. Id.  
 176. Id. at 1246. 
 177. Id. at 1249. 
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question on the merits. The court concluded that “Volusia County 
need not operate every beachfront lighting source itself to be held 
liable under the ESA. Rather, its indirect control over lighting is 
sufficient—at the very least—for purposes of standing.”178 The case 
was remanded to the district court to determine if the record 
supported the causal claim under section 9.179 
In United States v. Town of Plymouth,180 the FWS sued Plymouth, 
Massachusetts, for “allowing off-road vehicles (‘ORVs’) to drive on 
Plymouth Long Beach” without “appropriate precautions” to protect 
threatened piping plovers.181 Facing a similar situation to that in 
Loggerhead Turtle, the court held that the ORV regulations caused 
the take of piping plovers and issued an injunction to ban ORV 
driving in a designated area unless Plymouth followed the 
requirements of federal and state guidelines.182 The court agreed with 
previous cases that “the ESA’s prohibitions contemplate . . . the 
actions . . . of a third party authorized by the government to engage in 
activity resulting in a taking.”183  
Other district courts, following the Coxe model, have held 
government actors liable for issuing permits to or explicitly 
authorizing third parties whose actions harmed endangered species.184 
 
 178. Id. at 1250–51. In coming to this conclusion, the court cited Babbitt v. Sweet Home 
Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697–98 (1995), which determined that the 
statutory term “harm” “encompasses indirect as well as direct injuries.” Loggerhead Turtle, 148 
F.3d at 1250. 
 179. Loggerhead Turtle, 148 F.3d at 1258. On remand, the district court held that, though the 
artificial lighting harmed sea turtles, the county’s policies restricting lighting did not cause that 
harm. Although denying the section 9 claim, the court did not question the basic theory of 
vicarious liability. Loggerhead Turtle v. Cnty. Council, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1306–09 (M.D. Fla. 
2000).  
 180. United States v. Town of Plymouth, 6 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D. Mass. 1998). 
 181. Id. at 82. 
 182. Id.  
 183. Id. at 90 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1538(g) (1994) and Strahan v. Coxe, 939 F. Supp. 963 (D. 
Mass. 1996)).  
 184. See Aransas Project v. Shaw, 930 F. Supp. 2d 716, 787 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (holding the 
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality liable for a take because it authorized private 
withdrawals of freshwater from rivers that fed into endangered whooping crane habitat, 
harming the birds); Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Tidwell, 716 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1005–06 (D. Or. 
2010) (holding that the U.S. Forest Service violated sections 7 and 9 of the ESA by issuing 
grazing permits that led to takes of the steelhead in excess of its ITS); Animal Prot. Inst. v. 
Holsten, 541 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1081 (D. Minn. 2008) (granting summary judgment for 
environmental groups because the Minnesota Department of Natural Resource’s licensing of 
hunters and regulations authorizing the use of certain traps caused the take of the threatened 
Canada lynx); Pac. Rivers Council v. Brown, No. CV 02-243-BR, 2002 WL 32356431, at *12 (D. 
Or. Dec. 23, 2002) (holding that plaintiffs stated a claim that the state’s authorization of certain 
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Additionally, some courts have not decided the vicarious liability 
question, but have endorsed the theory in dicta, or at least not 
questioned its validity.185 Several courts have denied vicarious liability 
claims, but even these have not explicitly rejected the vicarious 
liability doctrine.186 Some vicarious liability cases have been dismissed 
due to a lack of factual evidence supporting the claims.187 Generally, 
courts have accepted the theory; however, only a few circuits have 
addressed the issue, which could make it difficult for states to 
accurately assess whether they are exposing themselves to liability 
under section 9. Understandably, state and local government 
reactions have been “varied and inconsistent” following the Coxe 
ruling.188 
The text of the ESA makes clear that some form of vicarious 
liability must be possible for harm to endangered species, as it 
explicitly allows someone to be liable under section 9 if they cause 
another to commit a take.189 Court cases have elaborated upon the 
contours of vicarious liability under the ESA and in several instances 
 
logging operations, which was required for the activities to begin, caused the take of the Oregon 
Coast coho salmon by damaging its habitat). 
 185. See Coal. for a Sustainable Delta v. McCamman, 725 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1164, 1203, 
1167–68 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (denying summary judgment for the plaintiffs on their claim that the 
California Department of Fish and Game’s striped bass sport-fishing regulations were causing 
takes of other listed fish, but citing Coxe with approval and not reaching the merits); Seattle 
Audubon Soc’y v. Sutherland, No. CV06-1608MJP, 2007 WL 1300964, at *6 (W.D. Wash. May 
1, 2007) (holding that two chapters of the Audubon Society had standing to challenge state 
agencies’ authorization of forest practices that lead to the take of the northern spotted owl, but 
not reaching the merits). 
 186. See Animal Welfare Inst. v. Martin, 623 F.3d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 2010) (denying 
environmental groups’ motion for summary judgment, which claimed that Maine agencies’ 
allowance of certain trapping devices caused the take of the Canada lynx); Strahan v. Linnon, 
No. 97-1787, 1998 WL 1085817, at *4 (1st Cir. July 16, 1998) (per curiam) (holding that the U.S. 
Coast Guard was not liable for the take of whales caused by the non-Coast Guard vessels that it 
licensed, because it was more analogous to automobile licensure than to Coxe). 
 187. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920, 922 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting 
Defenders’ claim that the construction of a school would cause the take of endangered pygmy 
owls on grounds of insufficient evidence); Strahan v. Pritchard, 473 F. Supp. 2d 230, 239 (D. 
Mass. 2007) (denying Strahan a preliminary injunction against Massachusetts because of 
insufficient evidence of injury to whales). Additionally, one district court decision rejected the 
application of vicarious liability in a suit regarding the take of a nonessential, experimental 
population of endangered species, governed by special rules under section 10(j) of the ESA, but 
it distinguished the case from a typical section 9 takings claim. See WildEarth Guardians v. 
Lane, No. CIV 12-118 LFG/KMB, 2012 WL 6019306, at *8, *15 (D.N.M. Dec. 3, 2012) (arguing 
that previous vicarious liability cases did not apply because populations protected under section 
10(j) are not afforded the same protections as other endangered species).  
 188. Ruhl, supra note 148, at 73.  
 189. See Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 9, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(g) (2012); supra Part II.A.  
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have held government actors liable for their policies and actions that 
authorize third parties to take endangered species. 
III.  DEVELOPING A PERSUASIVE FORMULATION OF THE VICARIOUS 
LIABILITY DOCTRINE 
Although successful in several courtrooms, the vicarious liability 
doctrine has received an unsympathetic reaction in the academic 
literature,190 which could persuade courts to reject the theory in the 
future. There are still many circuits with no binding precedent 
adopting or rejecting the vicarious liability doctrine under the ESA.191 
Courts that are not bound by precedent would be free to interpret 
section 9 differently, perhaps adopting the rationale of the doctrine’s 
critics. The Fifth Circuit, which encompasses Louisiana and, 
therefore, could be the venue for the case proposed in this Note, is 
one of the circuits without binding precedent on the vicarious liability 
doctrine.192 Therefore, prospective plaintiffs, here and in other states, 
should present the doctrine in its most persuasive light. 
In response to the main criticisms of the doctrine, this Part will 
argue for a new, more limited formulation of the vicarious liability 
doctrine. It will then address some of the procedural and 
constitutional hurdles that a vicarious liability suit may face and 
explain how a properly structured suit, illustrated by the Louisiana 
example, could overcome these challenges. 
A. Defining the Contours of the Vicarious Liability Doctrine 
Professor J.B. Ruhl argues that vicarious liability is a blanket 
term that actually encompasses three distinct types of liability, each of 
 
 190. See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal 
Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 428–30 (2005); Brader, supra note 150; Ruhl, 
supra note 148. 
 191. Only the First, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that a government actor can be 
liable for policies that cause third parties to take endangered species. See Loggerhead Turtle v. 
Cnty. Council, 148 F.3d 1231, 1242 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding a county liable for its lighting 
policy, which allowed third parties to light the beach in a way that harmed sea turtles); Strahan 
v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 163 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding the state of Massachusetts liable for 
fishermen’s use of gear that harmed northern right whales); Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 
F.2d 1294, 1303 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding the EPA liable for registering a pesticide that, when 
applied to the ground by third parties, harmed black-footed ferrets). 
 192. Although in Sierra Club v. Yeutter the Fifth Circuit held the U.S. Forest Service liable 
under section 9 for takes caused by tree-harvesting methods, this ruling was applied to a federal 
agency’s actions authorizing habitat destruction on federal lands, distinguishing it from many 
other vicarious liability cases. See supra notes 146–48 and accompanying text. 
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which is utilized in a different set of cases.193 First is the “Proprietary 
Owner/Operator” model, exemplified in Yeutter and Town of 
Plymouth, in which the government owns and operates the land on 
which the take occurs.194 Ruhl accepts this form of vicarious liability 
because the government is liable in exactly the same way as a private 
landowner might be for the acts of third parties that they have 
allowed on their land.195 Second is “Permitting and Licensing 
Liability,” demonstrated in Coxe and Defenders.196 This model applies 
whenever a government actor has the discretionary power to grant a 
permit for actions that can cause takes.197 Ruhl determines that this 
type of liability has “no reasoned basis,”198 an argument this Note 
refutes in Part IV. The third model is based on “Inadequate 
Regulation” and is epitomized by Loggerhead Turtle.199 Under this 
model, “a state or local government is liable when it fails to prevent 
privately caused takes through exercise of its regulatory authority.”200 
Ruhl finds this model indefensible because it holds states liable for 
failing to regulate in ways that only the federal government is 
required to do under the ESA.201 
The “Inadequate Regulation” version of the vicarious liability 
doctrine is the most challenging to defend. The model creates 
practical problems because it is difficult to determine when a state 
would be liable. The critics contemplate the worst possible scenario: 
that states will be forced to issue the perfect regulations, or be liable 
for takes.202 The state may be liable even for beneficial but imperfect 
regulations that fail to prevent some takes.203 As Ruhl argues, in 
modern society “almost no private action takes place in the complete 
 
 193. Ruhl, supra note 148, at 73–75. 
 194. Id. at 73. 
 195. Id.  
 196. Id.  
 197. Id.  
 198. See id. (arguing primarily that Congress intended only federal agencies to be vicariously 
liable for takes that result from the permitting and licensing of private activities).  
 199. Id. at 75.  
 200. Id.  
 201. Id. Additionally, sometimes the risk to listed species could be addressed by either 
federal or state regulation. It seems unfair to “penalize states for the failures of the federal 
government.” Id. at 77. 
 202. Shannon Petersen, Note, Endangered Species in the Urban Jungle: How the ESA Will 
Reshape American Cities, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 423, 440–41 (2000) (“[S]tate and local officials 
could have been fined and imprisoned for failing to implement regulations that prevent private 
activities resulting in illegal takes.”). 
 203. See supra notes 173–78 and accompanying text. 
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absence of some connection to government regulation . . . . So, the 
theory goes, let’s simply sue the government for failing sufficiently to 
regulate life as we know it.”204 Shannon Petersen, an environmental 
lawyer and another critic of vicarious liability, argues that in the 
licensing cases “the government entities acted affirmatively to license 
or permit activities that resulted in illegal takings. In Loggerhead 
Turtle, however, Volusia County was held liable for failing to regulate 
beachfront lighting in a way that would protect the turtle—a 
distinction, in other words, between misfeasance and nonfeasance.”205 
Petersen’s distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance is 
compelling. Misfeasance has been characterized as “active 
misconduct working positive injury to others,” whereas nonfeasance 
is “passive inaction or a failure to take steps to protect [others] from 
harm.”206 These two concepts were adopted to demonstrate a key 
distinction in tort law: generally, a person is not liable for failing to 
act (nonfeasance) unless some special duty exists.207 This reflects the 
notion that punishing nonfeasance may encroach on individual 
freedom.208 Additionally, misfeasance might be easier to detect and 
deter, and in some circumstances may be seen as more morally 
reprehensible than a mere failure to act.209 
These concepts provide a useful way to limit the vicarious 
liability doctrine. A line could be drawn between affirmative action of 
the state that causes take (cases of misfeasance, such as Defenders 
and Coxe) and a lack of appropriate regulations (cases of 
nonfeasance, such as Loggerhead Turtle). This formulation of the 
doctrine would exclude Ruhl’s category of “Inadequate Regulation” 
 
 204. Ruhl, supra note 148, at 70.  
 205. Petersen, supra note 202, at 434 (emphasis added). 
 206. W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON TORTS 373 (5th ed. 1984). 
 207. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965) (“The fact that the actor realizes 
or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of 
itself impose upon him a duty to take such action.”); id. § 314 cmt. c (“The origin of the rule lay 
in the early common law distinction between action and inaction, or ‘misfeasance’ and ‘non-
feasance.’”). 
 208. See Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty To Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 
U. PA. L. REV. 217, 219–20 (1908) (describing the “positive loss” of freedom that runs counter to 
the “attitude of extreme individualism so typical of anglo-saxon legal thought”).  
 209. But see Philip W. Romohr, Note, A Right/Duty Perspective on the Legal and 
Philosophical Foundations of the No-Duty-To-Rescue Rule, 55 DUKE L.J. 1025, 1025 (2006) 
(noting the morally repugnant nature of some forms of nonfeasance, and pointing out that “the 
absence of a duty to rescue . . . has been criticized by the vast majority of legal scholarship on 
the subject”). 
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while including “Permitting and Licensing Liability.” By limiting 
vicarious liability to affirmative state actions that cause others to 
commit takes, application of the doctrine would be more predictable, 
and states could modify their behavior accordingly. 
B. Applying the Theory to Louisiana’s Noncompliance with TED 
Regulations 
This more narrow construction of the vicarious liability doctrine, 
adopting the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction, would still easily 
encompass the proposed suit against Louisiana. Currently, Louisiana 
requires all fishermen, vessels, and gear employed in commercial 
shrimp trawling to obtain a license from the state.210 In this case, the 
trawl itself, which may or may not have a TED installed, is the gear 
that must be licensed.211 The argument for holding Louisiana liable 
would be patterned after Coxe and based on the theory of vicarious 
liability: when Louisiana issues licenses to shrimping vessels and gear 
that do not have TEDs installed, it is authorizing shrimp trawlers to 
take sea turtles.212 
As noted, the only exemption from section 9 liability is typically 
an ITS or ITP.213 However, special regulations provide a blanket 
exception for the incidental take of sea turtles during shrimp 
trawling.214 There is one major condition on this exemption: the 
individual must comply with all relevant regulations, including those 
requiring the installation of TEDs.215 Louisiana’s shrimp fishery has 
violated this regulation by not installing TEDs, and therefore is not 
exempted from liability. Louisiana could come into compliance with 
 
 210. LA. DEP’T OF WILDLIFE & FISHERIES, LOUISIANA COMMERCIAL FISHING 
REGULATIONS 2013, at 6–7 (2013), available at http://www.wlf.louisiana.gov/sites/default/files/
pdf/publication/31745-commercial-fishing-regulations/2013_commercial_fishing_low-res.pdf; see 
LA. DEP’T OF WILDLIFE & FISHERIES, supra note 37, at 1-4 to 1-5 (noting these requirements). 
 211. LA. DEP’T OF WILDLIFE & FISHERIES, supra note 210, at 30 (noting that fishing gear 
includes any shrimp trawl). 
 212. See Bean, supra note 131, at 10,286 (suggesting that states could be “liable for the 
drowning of sea turtles by the boats that they license to fish for shrimp” and comparing the 
situation to Coxe).  
 213. See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text. The ITS for the southeastern shrimp 
fishery sets guidelines for NMFS’s regulation of the shrimp fishery, but it does not provide 
instructions for states. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 3, at 196–205.  
 214. 50 C.F.R. § 223.206(d) (2013). 
 215. Id. 
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the ESA by obtaining an ITP,216 but NMFS is unlikely to grant an ITP 
to a state that refuses to enforce federal TED requirements. 
Critics warn that state sovereign immunity will bar most 
vicarious liability suits.217 As a general rule, a state cannot be sued by 
a citizen of the United States without its consent.218 However, the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Ex parte Young219 provides a large 
exception to the sovereign immunity defense by upholding the 
longstanding tradition of suits for prospective injunctive relief against 
individual officers of a state for violations of the Constitution.220 Ex 
parte Young essentially creates a legal fiction: although the officer 
must be the named party, the state’s actions can be enjoined.221 In 
2002, the Court reaffirmed Ex parte Young, holding that suits against 
state officers can be brought for violations of federal statutes, not just 
the Constitution.222 These rulings provide clear guidelines for how to 
bring a vicarious liability suit without being blocked by state 
sovereign immunity. In the Louisiana example, the case should be 
brought against the state officers who are responsible for issuing 
shrimp vessel licenses, such as the head of the Louisiana Department 
of Wildlife and Fisheries.223 As Ex parte Young allows, the suit would 
name the individual state officers but could effectively hold the state 
of Louisiana responsible. Additionally, Ex parte Young requires a 
 
 216. See id. § 223.206(a)(2) (authorizing the issuance of ITPs). 
 217. See Melious, supra note 90, at 636–52 (discussing dual sovereignty concerns raised by 
the ESA); Petersen, supra note 202, at 447 (“The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides 
a . . . reason why the holdings of at least Strahan and Loggerhead Turtle should be limited or 
overturned.”); see also Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 11, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (2012) 
(providing that any person can bring suit under the ESA to enjoin “the United States and any 
other governmental instrumentality or agency (to the extent permitted by the [E]leventh 
[A]mendment to the Constitution), who is alleged to be in violation of” the ESA).  
 218. The Eleventh Amendment provides: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not 
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. XI. This language enacts the common law understanding of state sovereign 
immunity, which bars any suit against a state without its consent by any citizen of that state or 
any other state. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10, 16–21 (1890) (interpreting the amendment 
to bar suits by a state’s own citizens, despite no textual basis in the Eleventh Amendment).  
 219. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 220. Id. at 155–56. 
 221. Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 649 (2002) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (calling Ex parte Young a “legal fiction”).  
 222. Id. at 645. 
 223. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56:30.1 (2004) (granting the Department the power to issue 
hunting and fishing licenses).  
DAMIANO IN PP (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2014 8:27 PM 
2014] A DEFENSE OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY 1573 
prospective remedy,224 so the suit should ask for an injunction against 
the future licensing of shrimping vessels and gear that do not comply 
with TED regulations. Several other vicarious liability cases have 
requested similar relief and were not barred by state sovereign 
immunity.225 
Critics also warn of Tenth Amendment obstacles.226 The United 
States’ federalist system dictates that “Congress may not simply 
‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly 
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory 
program.’”227 Doing so would “infring[e] upon the core of state 
sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment.”228 The 
anticommandeering doctrine therefore bars certain remedies against 
states. 
Though the courts cannot force a state to enact a particular 
regulation,229 they may order a state to stop affirmative actions that 
violate federal law without unconstitutionally commandeering state 
officials. The proposed Louisiana case is analogous to the situation in 
South Carolina v. Baker,230 in which the Supreme Court “upheld a 
[federal] statute that prohibited States from issuing unregistered 
bonds because the law ‘regulate[d] state activities,’ rather than 
‘seek[ing] to control or influence the manner in which States regulate 
private parties.’”231 Similarly, in the Louisiana case, the vicarious 
liability doctrine does not require the state to regulate private 
 
 224. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974) (holding that the Ex parte Young doctrine 
only allows for prospective relief); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 156 (allowing for state officers to 
be enjoined). 
 225. See Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 166–67 (1st Cir. 1997) (rejecting defendants’ 
argument that the relief requested was barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Seattle Audubon 
Soc’y v. Sutherland, No. C06-1608MJP, 2007 WL 1577756, at *2 (W.D. Wash. May 30, 2007) 
(recognizing that Ex parte Young allowed a suit against state officers responsible for enforcing a 
challenged state law); Pac. Rivers Council v. Brown, No. CV 02-243, 2002 WL 32356431, at *1, 
*5–6 (D. Or. Dec. 23, 2002) (finding that plaintiffs’ suit against the State Forester of Oregon was 
not barred by the Eleventh Amendment).  
 226. E.g., Brader, supra note 150, at 125–28. 
 227. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).  
 228. Id. at 177. 
 229. See Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429, 440 (5th Cir. 1991) (“The court’s injunction 
eviscerated the consultation process by effectively dictating the results of that process. Thus, the 
court exceeded its authority to enjoin violations of the ESA.”).  
 230. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988). 
 231. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 150 (2000) (second and third alterations in original) 
(quoting Baker, 485 U.S. at 514–15).  
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individuals; it simply requires the state to comply with federal law 
when undertaking its own regulatory activities. Here, again, the 
distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance is useful: if the state 
chooses not to regulate at all (nonfeasance), it cannot be liable. If the 
state chooses to regulate but does so in a way that violates federal law 
(misfeasance), then the federal government has the authority to hold 
the state responsible for that action. Just as South Carolina could not 
issue unregistered bonds in Baker, Louisiana may not issue a license 
for the use of illegal gear that will necessarily lead to the take of sea 
turtles. 
Therefore, the anticommandeering doctrine should not bar a suit 
against Louisiana seeking an injunction to stop the licensing of shrimp 
trawls that do not have TEDs installed. Several vicarious liability 
cases have overcome Tenth Amendment defenses.232 Additionally, 
some of the leading critics concede that a properly structured suit 
would not violate the anticommandeering doctrine.233 Ruhl, for 
example, states that a permissible remedy for a licensing/permitting 
case would be “to order the state to either stop issuing the permits or 
obtain its own ESA permit to continue issuing the permits.”234 As long 
as a suit is properly structured, state sovereign immunity and the 
Tenth Amendment do not present insurmountable barriers to a 
vicarious liability suit. 
 
 232. See, e.g., Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 170 (1st Cir. 1997) (“Here, the defendants are 
not being ordered to take positive steps with respect to advancing the goals of a federal 
regulatory scheme. Rather, the court directed the defendants to find a means of bringing the 
Commonwealth’s scheme into compliance with federal law.”); Yeutter, 926 F.2d at 439 (“[T]he 
court may enjoin the agency from continuing activity that has resulted in past violations and, to 
the extent necessary, may dictate temporarily the actions the agency must take with regard to 
that activity until the party has submitted to the court an acceptable plan of its own.”); Seattle 
Audubon Soc’y v. Sutherland, No. C06-1608MJP, 2007 WL 1300964, at *14 (W.D. Wash. May 
30, 2007) (“If the Court finds for Plaintiffs on the merits, it can craft an injunction that orders 
state officials to stop violating the ESA, but avoids ordering the state to take ‘positive steps with 
respect to advancing the goals of a federal regulatory scheme.’ Thus, the Tenth Amendment 
does not bar Plaintiffs’ action, nor does it undermine Plaintiffs’ standing.” (citation omitted) 
(quoting Coxe, 127 F.3d at 170)). 
 233. See, e.g., Petersen, supra note 202, at 443 (arguing that Loggerhead Turtle and 
Plymouth should be overturned because they violate the Tenth Amendment, but conceding that 
Coxe “probably does not violate the Tenth Amendment, or the Supreme Court decisions”); 
Ruhl, supra note 148, at 76 (“[O]nly the inadequate regulation theory presents any real Tenth 
Amendment concern.”). 
 234. Ruhl, supra note 148, at 77. 
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IV.  DEFENDING THE VICARIOUS LIABILITY DOCTRINE 
Vicarious liability in the context of the ESA offers an appealing 
option for environmentalists and other interested parties to hold state 
and local governments liable when their authorization causes a third 
party to take endangered species. As described in Part III.B., under 
the vicarious liability doctrine, Louisiana could be liable for licensing 
shrimp trawling vessels and gear that do not have TEDs installed. 
This theory, however, has faced almost unanimous disapproval in the 
academic literature, and there is binding precedent upholding it in 
only a few jurisdictions.235 The doctrine may be on thin ice. 
A limited version of vicarious liability that focuses on state or 
local governments’ misfeasance (that is, affirmative actions that cause 
others to commit a take) is much more likely to persuade a court than 
a broader theory encompassing nonfeasance.236 The narrower version 
of vicarious liability proposed in this Note is consistent with the text 
and general purpose of the ESA, would be a desirable and reasonable 
practical tool for conservation, and could form the basis for a 
successful challenge to Louisiana’s regulatory program. 
A. Vicarious Liability Is Supported by the Text and Legislative 
History of the ESA 
The ESA’s purpose is “to provide a means whereby the 
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species 
depend may be conserved[] [and] to provide a program for the 
conservation of such endangered species and threatened species.”237 
The statute recognizes that protected species “are of esthetic, 
ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to 
the Nation and its people.”238 The Supreme Court, reflecting on the 
ESA, explained that “Congress intended endangered species to be 
afforded the highest of priorities.”239 
The text of the ESA should therefore be read in the context of 
this overarching purpose. Section 9 of the ESA forbids any person, 
 
 235. See supra Part II.B.  
 236. See supra Part III.A. 
 237. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2012).  
 238. Id. § 1531(a)(3).  
 239. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978). In Tennessee Valley Authority v. 
Hill, the Court affirmed an injunction barring the completion of a nearly finished dam—despite 
the large government investment in the project—because completion of the dam would 
eradicate a newly listed endangered species called the snail darter. Id. at 156–71, 195. 
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including “any State, municipality, or political subdivision of a State,” 
from “caus[ing] to be committed” the take of any listed species.240 Its 
provisions explicitly declare that a state violates section 9 if it causes a 
person to commit a take. With the clear language of the ESA 
supporting vicarious liability, the question is really one of degree: 
what level of state action is sufficiently coercive to cause another to 
commit a take? 
The federal regulations requiring TEDs follow the same format 
as the statutory language, thus creating a second textual basis for the 
vicarious liability theory in the Louisiana case, and a second potential 
claim. According to the regulations, “it is unlawful for any 
person . . . to . . . [o]wn, operate, or be on board a vessel”241 or to 
“[f]ish for, catch, take, harvest, or possess, fish or wildlife while on 
board a vessel, except if that vessel is in compliance with all 
applicable provisions of § 223.206(d).”242 Section 223.206(d) requires 
TEDs to be installed in most shrimp trawls.243 Like the ESA, the 
regulations specify that it is also unlawful to “[a]ttempt to do, solicit 
another to do, or cause to be done” any of the listed violations.244  If a 
state government causes a third party to operate a vessel or harvest 
shrimp from a vessel that does not comply with TED regulations, that 
government has violated the TED regulations. 
The statutory text creates the foundation for the vicarious 
liability doctrine, and the legislative history and relevant cases clarify 
and provide support for the text. In Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Communities for a Great Oregon,245 the Supreme Court determined 
that section 9’s take prohibition, and specifically the definition of 
“harm,”246 should be interpreted broadly and encompasses indirect 
takes.247 In contrast to previous versions of the ESA passed in 1966 
and 1969, which restricted only those takes that occurred on federal 
land, “the 1973 Act applied to all land in the United States and to the 
Nation’s territorial seas.”248 Additionally, the 1973 Act was the first to 
 
 240. See supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text.  
 241. 50 C.F.R. § 223.205(b)(1) (2012). 
 242. Id. § 223.205(b)(2). 
 243. Id. § 223.206(d)(2).  
 244. Id. § 223.205(b)(22). 
 245. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
 246. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2012). 
 247. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 700. 
 248. Id. at 698. 
DAMIANO IN PP (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2014 8:27 PM 
2014] A DEFENSE OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY 1577 
include the word “harm” in the definition of “take,”249 indicating 
Congress’s intention to expand liability under section 9 to reach a 
greater category of actions. Further, in 1982 Congress authorized 
ITPs, which allow people to commit a take that is otherwise 
prohibited “if such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the 
carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.”250 The Court found this 
“strongly suggest[ed]” that section 9 intended “to prohibit indirect as 
well as deliberate takings.”251 
Contrastingly, Petersen argues that the legislative history 
demonstrates that “Congress never intended [section 9] to extend to 
state and local regulatory regimes.”252 Petersen interprets the fact that 
“Congress debated little over the scope and meaning of section 9” to 
mean that it intended to cover only direct takes.253 Petersen’s 
interpretation of the legislative history contradicts section 9(g), which 
explicitly states that a person is liable if they “cause to be committed” 
any violation of the ESA.254 As the Court in Sweet Home concluded, 
when Congress inserts a broad term like “harm” into the definition of 
take and does not extensively debate that addition, a court should 
give the provision “a respectful reading” and not dismiss its plain 
meaning.255 
Sweet Home upheld the regulatory definition of harm,256 which 
included “significant habitat modification or degradation where it 
actually kills or injures wildlife,”257 and did not specifically address 
vicarious liability. But the same rationale can apply to both questions. 
In fact, banning indirect takes exacted through habitat modification 
but not through the states’ authorization of actions that will harm 
endangered species would lead to an illogical result. For example, if 
Louisiana chose to dump a chemical in the water that harmed sea 
turtles, that would be a significant habitat modification that actually 
injures or kills a listed species, and the state would be liable for an 
 
 249. Id. at 705. 
 250. Id. at 700 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).  
 251. Id. 
 252. Petersen, supra note 198, at 442. 
 253. Id. But see Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 705 (expressing disagreement with “a narrow 
interpretation” of “harm”). 
 254. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(g) (2012).  
 255. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 705. 
 256. Id. at 695. 
 257. 50 C.F.R § 17.3 (1994). 
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indirect take through the “harm” prong of the take provision.258 
Similarly, the state creates a dangerous habitat for sea turtles by 
licensing illegal shrimp-trawling gear: throughout the Louisiana state 
waters, sea turtles can be captured, injured, and killed by the 
thousands due to the inescapable nets that trawl through their feeding 
grounds. Given Congress’s intent to protect endangered species 
“whatever the cost,”259 both of these indirect but foreseeable ways of 
causing a take should be prohibited. 
The definition of person260 shows that Congress intended section 
9 of the ESA to apply equally to federal and state governments. 
However, other provisions of the ESA do limit federal action more 
strictly than states. Section 7 creates an affirmative duty for the 
federal agencies to “utilize their authorities in furtherance of the 
purposes of [the ESA] by carrying out programs for the conservation 
of endangered species.”261 The ESA requires federal agencies to 
consult with the Services to insure that any agency action “is not 
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered 
species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse 
modification of habitat of such species.”262 Ruhl and attorney Valerie 
Brader both assert that vicarious liability confuses the affirmative 
duties assigned to the federal government in section 7 and the take 
prohibition of section 9 that applies more broadly.263 According to 
Brader, the vicarious liability theory requires states to perform the 
same level of analysis as the federal government and comply with the 
ESA as if it had gone through consultation.264 
This argument is flawed because it ignores the many, well-
reasoned differences between the section 7 and section 9 
requirements. Section 7(a)(2) uniquely requires federal agencies to 
undergo a thorough consultation process whenever an action could 
harm an endangered species.265 Imposing such a requirement on the 
states would be time consuming and would greatly expand the 
Services’ administrative responsibilities. The ESA’s structure makes 
 
 258. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2013) (“Harm in the definition of ‘take’ . . . . include[s] significant 
habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife . . . .”). 
 259. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978). 
 260. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (2012); see supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 261. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1). 
 262. Id. § 1536(a)(2).  
 263. Brader, supra note 150, at 109; Ruhl, supra note 148, at 74. 
 264. Brader, supra note 150, at 120. 
 265. See supra notes 110–13 and accompanying text.  
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sense: it holds states liable for the actual unauthorized taking of 
species but does not require states to undergo a specific 
administrative process. States are free to request advice from the 
Services on a particular action266 or to form a cooperative agreement 
with the federal government,267 but neither option is mandated.268 This 
mitigates the problem that requiring states to consult might violate 
the principles inherent in our system of federalism.269 The differing 
requirements in sections 7 and 9 also are practical: because liability 
for a take is bound by the ordinary requirements of foreseeability,270 
states should know that they are authorizing third parties to commit a 
take and be able to avoid that action without conducting a time-
consuming consultation. 
Additionally, the prohibition against causing “jeopard[y]” in 
section 7271 is distinct from the prohibition against “take[s]” in section 
9.272 First, the take provision applies to fish and wildlife, but the 
jeopardy provision also extends to listed plants.273 Second, the 
jeopardy provision covers actions that are likely to “result in the 
destruction or adverse modification of [critical] habitat,”274 whereas 
the take provision is narrower, banning “significant habitat 
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures 
wildlife.”275 Lastly, jeopardy is a species-level evaluation, whereas a 
 
 266. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(a).  
 267. Id. § 1535(c). 
 268. See Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Sutherland, No. CV06-1608MJP, 2007 WL 1300964, at *8 
(W.D. Wash. May 1, 2007) (“[T]he fact that Congress imposed increased regulatory 
responsibilities on federal agencies and made state participation in a regulatory program 
voluntary is a separate issue from whether Congress intended to make states liable when they 
authorize others to take endangered species.”). 
 269. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (2004) (“While Congress has 
substantial powers to govern the Nation directly, including in areas of intimate concern to the 
States, the Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to 
require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.”); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 
U.S. 505, 513 (1988) (“[T]he Tenth Amendment might set some limits on Congress’ power to 
compel States to regulate on behalf of federal interests.” (citing FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 
742, 761–64 (1982)).  
 270. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 700 n.13 
(1995). 
 271. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
 272. Id. §§ 1532(19), 1538(a)(1)(B)–(C).  
 273. Loggerhead Turtle v. Cnty. Council, 148 F.3d 1231, 1246 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing 16 
U.S.C. §§ 1532(16), 1536(a)(2), 1538(a)(1) (1994)).  
 274. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)). 
 275. Id. at 1238 (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1997)) (quotation mark omitted); see also Sweet 
Home, 515 U.S. at 703 (“Section 7 imposes a broad, affirmative duty to avoid adverse habitat 
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take occurs if an individual member of the species is harmed. 
Therefore “some activities—especially those relating to land use—are 
more likely to result in ‘jeopardy’ than a ‘take.’”276 
Ruhl argues that having both section 7(a)(2) and a broadly 
applicable section 9 imposing duties on the federal government would 
be redundant, as any federal agency action that indirectly or directly 
takes a listed species would be controlled by both sections.277 
However, both provisions typically will not apply concurrently to the 
same action because once a federal agency has consulted on an action 
and obtained a BiOp and ITS, it will not be liable under section 9 as 
long as it complies with the ITS. Additionally, any overlap that exists 
would not be eliminated by rejecting vicarious liability, because there 
could still be instances in which the federal government directly 
commits a take and violates section 7’s jeopardy provision. As the 
Court in Sweet Home concluded, “Any overlap that . . . § 7 may have 
with § 9 in particular cases is unexceptional, and simply reflects the 
broad purpose of the Act set out in § 2 . . . .”278 
Ruhl also argues that “Congress knew exactly how to extend 
vicarious liability for permitting and licensing and did so with respect 
to federal agencies only.”279 Section 7 defines an agency action as “any 
action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency,”280 whereas 
section 9 does not state that any action authorized, funded, or carried 
out by a state is subject to the take provision.281  However, this fact is 
not detrimental to the theory of vicarious liability. It was necessary to 
define an agency action in section 7 because the federal agencies have 
to know with certainty when to initiate consultation with the Services. 
Section 9 does not impose procedural requirements on the states or 
any other person. It is more focused on the end result of the action—
 
modifications that § 9 does not replicate, and § 7 does not limit its admonition to habitat 
modification that ‘actually kills or injures wildlife.’”). 
 276. Loggerhead Turtle, 148 F.3d at 1246 (citing Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 703); see also 
Andrew J. Doyle, Note, Sharing Home Sweet Home with Federally Protected Wildlife, 25 
STETSON L. REV. 889, 911 n.174 (1996) (“[I]t is easier to ‘jeopardize’ than it is to ‘harm.’”). 
 277. See Ruhl, supra note 148, at 74 (“If Section 9 covers actions governments authorize, it 
would have been unnecessary for Congress in Section 7(a)(2) expressly to refer to government 
authorizations by federal agencies.”). 
 278. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 703 (citation omitted); see also Russello v. United States, 464 
U.S. 16, 24 n.2 (1983) (“There may well be factual situations to which both subsections apply. 
The subsections, however, are clearly not wholly redundant.”).  
 279. Ruhl, supra note 148, at 73.  
 280. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012). 
 281. Id. § 1538(g).  
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the harm imposed on listed species. Moreover, section 9 applies to 
both government and non-government actors; creating an exhaustive 
list of each type of action that could be carried out by this myriad of 
actors and could potentially cause take would be impractical. 
Overall, the vicarious liability doctrine fits logically with the 
statutory scheme of the ESA. It has a strong textual basis, is 
consistent with the overall purpose of protecting listed species, and 
maintains a reasonable structural balance between state and federal 
responsibility. 
B. Vicarious Liability Would Be a Desirable and Practical Way To 
Protect Species 
The practical implications of vicarious liability also support the 
theory’s application. Critics claim that the vicarious liability doctrine 
would be catastrophic for the states, but many of these fears are in 
reaction to the “Inadequate Regulation” model of vicarious liability 
exemplified in Loggerhead Turtle.282 However, this Note proposes a 
more limited version of vicarious liability that does not hold states 
liable for nonexistent or imperfect regulations.283 Instead, vicarious 
liability should focus on holding states liable when they perform an 
affirmative action—such as issuing a license—to authorize behavior 
that is known to cause takes. This limited version of vicarious liability 
accomplishes the doctrine’s primary goals, both generally and in the 
proposed case against Louisiana, while avoiding some of the practical 
obstacles. 
The vicarious liability doctrine is useful to protect species that 
are “threatened by diffuse, untraceable actions of private actors.”284 
The take of sea turtles by shrimp trawls is usually first noticed when 
someone spots an injured or dead turtle, after the perpetrator of the 
take is nowhere to be found.285 Government inspectors could observe 
an occasional take through extensive monitoring, but it would be very 
challenging for private individuals to witness and document a take in 
order to raise a citizen suit. Individual enforcement simply would not 
be an efficient way to combat the unlawful operation of an entire 
 
 282. For a description of the “Inadequate Regulation” model and its weaknesses, see supra 
notes 199–205 and accompanying text. 
 283. See supra Part III.A.  
 284. Ruhl, supra note 148, at 70.  
 285. See id. (providing the same rationale in the context of the take of manatees, whose 
carcasses are discovered after being hit by a boat, when “the boater is long gone”). 
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fishery.286 In the Louisiana example and many other potential 
situations, vicarious liability may be the only practical way for private 
individuals to remedy the large-scale taking of endangered species. 
There are several key limitations to the vicarious liability 
doctrine to ensure that states will not face an onslaught of 
unpredictable suits. For instance, there are alternative ways that 
states can avoid liability for takes. Professor Jean Melious argues that 
“states may take advantage of flexible ESA mechanisms”287 like 
obtaining an ITP that allows for takes in accordance with the state’s 
Habitat Conservation Plan.288 There also are four inherent limits built 
into all vicarious liability litigation: First, the plaintiffs must 
demonstrate standing. Second, the action must result in a take, so it 
must actually harm or harass an endangered species.289 Third, the 
resulting take must have been foreseeable when the state committed 
the action.290 Fourth, the action must be the proximate cause of the 
take.291 Because of these clear limits, the state should be able to 
predict and avoid liability under section 9, but will be liable when its 
actions actually cause others to commit a take, in accordance with 
section 9(g).292 
The Louisiana example provides a good demonstration of these 
limitations. First, the plaintiffs must demonstrate standing,293 which 
requires an “injury in fact” that “is fairly traceable to the challenged 
action” and likely to “be redressed by a favorable decision.”294 The 
 
 286. See supra Part I.C.  
 287. Melious, supra note 90, at 620. 
 288. Id. at 621. Melious also lists other mechanisms that allow for flexibility in states’ 
compliance with the ESA. Id. at 621–30.  
 289. See Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 9(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2012); 50 C.F.R. 
§ 17.3 (2013). But see Brader, supra note 150, at 110 (arguing that under vicarious liability, state 
regulations that cause some habitat modification, even if no actual harm occurs, could be 
considered a take). 
 290. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 700 n.13 
(1995) (noting that section 9 liability is limited by the “ordinary requirements of proximate 
causation and foreseeability”). 
 291. Id.  
 292. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(g) (“It is unlawful for any person . . . to attempt to commit, solicit 
another to commit, or cause to be committed, any offense defined in this section.”).  
 293. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 789–90 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]f the 
plaintiff lacks Art. III standing to bring a lawsuit, then there is no “case or controversy” within 
the meaning of Art. III and hence the matter is not within the area of responsibility assigned to 
the Judiciary by the Constitution.”). 
 294. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 
(2000) (restating the requirements laid out in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–
61 (1992)).  
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standing test will be applied strictly in vicarious liability cases because 
when “a plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the government’s 
allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, 
much more is needed” to establish standing than when the plaintiff is 
“himself an object of the [challenged] action.”295 Plaintiffs who can 
demonstrate an injury in fact, such as those who study sea turtles or 
regularly observe sea turtles recreationally, could have standing.296 
The injury would not be “conjectural or hypothetical”297 because there 
is conclusive evidence of sea turtle mortality from interactions with 
shrimp trawls that do not use TEDs.298 
To satisfy the next prong of the standing analysis, the prospective 
plaintiffs would have to demonstrate that their injury is fairly 
traceable to the challenged action—for example, Louisiana’s licensing 
of shrimping vessels with unlawful gear. The injury cannot “result[] 
from the independent action of some third party not before the 
court.”299 Brader thinks that these cases will fail because they are 
based on independent, third-party action—in this case, that of the 
shrimp fishermen.300 She also argues that “issuing a permit for an 
illegal activity may not cause a take if the third-party permittee does 
not then independently choose to engage in the activity.”301 
Brader’s argument fails to recognize that an “injury can be fairly 
traced to the actions of both parties and non-parties.”302 The issue of 
traceability turns on whether the shrimper’s action was a superseding 
cause of the take. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that 
“[w]here the negligent conduct of the actor creates or increases the 
foreseeable risk of harm through the intervention of another force, 
and is a substantial factor in causing the harm, such intervention is 
 
 295. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561–62. 
 296. See id. at 562–63 (“[T]he desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely 
esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing.”). 
 297. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180. 
 298. See Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Sutherland, No. CV06-1608MJP, 2007 WL 1300964, at *5 
(W.D. Wash. May 1, 2007) (“[I]t is not ‘hypothetical or tenuous’ that timber companies will 
actually conduct the forest practices for which they have requested and received Department 
approval . . . .”). 
 299. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976).  
 300. Brader, supra note 150, at 116. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Loggerhead Turtle v. Cnty. Council, 148 F.3d 1231, 1247 (11th Cir. 1998); see also Nat’l 
Audubon Soc’y, Inc. v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 849 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that a “chain of 
causation” can have “more than one link”). 
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not a superseding cause.”303 Additionally, it declares that if the state’s 
action is negligent because it creates “the likelihood that a third 
person may act in a particular manner,” then “such an act whether 
innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not 
prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby.”304 The 
Restatement (Third) of Torts consolidates the intervening cause 
sections of the Restatement (Second) into one rule: “When a force of 
nature or an independent act is also a factual cause of harm, an 
actor’s liability is limited to those harms that result from the risks that 
made the actor’s conduct tortious.”305 An actor is liable “when there is 
a foreseeable risk of improper conduct, including criminal activity, by 
another.”306 In accordance with these principles, the Supreme Court 
has recognized that third-party action could potentially break the 
chain of causation but does not do so if the third-party action was 
caused or influenced by the defendant.307 
The licensing of gear without TEDs creates and increases the 
foreseeable risk that shrimpers will not use TEDs, given that the 
shrimpers know that they have satisfied all state requirements and 
that federal requirements will not be enforced.308 In fact, the state’s 
issuance of a license could affirmatively encourage the illegal action 
because the shrimpers might assume that obtaining the permit means 
that they have complied with all necessary rules, including federal 
regulations.309 Either way, Louisiana’s licensure of illegal gear is a 
“substantial factor in causing the harm”310 to sea turtles and creates a 
“foreseeable risk of improper conduct” by the shrimpers,311 and 
therefore, the shrimpers’ failure to use TEDs is not a superseding 
cause. 
 
 303. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442A (1965).  
 304. Id. § 449.  
 305. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 34 (2010).  
 306. Id. § 34 cmt. d; see also id. § 19 (“The conduct of a defendant can lack reasonable care 
insofar as it foreseeably combines with or permits the improper conduct of . . . a third party.”). 
 307. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997).  
 308. See Animal Prot. Inst. v. Holsten, 541 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1079 (D. Minn. 2008) (“[T]he 
DNR’s licensure and regulation of trapping is the ‘stimulus’ for the trappers [sic] conduct that 
results in incidental takings. Accordingly, the trappers [sic] conduct is not an independent 
intervening cause that breaks the chain of causation between the DNR and the incidental 
takings of lynx.”). 
 309. I would like to thank Professor Ernest Young for pointing out this possibility.  
 310. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.  
 311. See supra note 306 and accompanying text. 
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The traceability requirement can also be examined through the 
lens of but-for causation, which is closely tied to the third prong of the 
standing requirement, redressability.312 In this case, shrimp trawling 
cannot occur until the operator, vessel, and gear obtain the necessary 
licenses from Louisiana, making the licenses a but-for cause of the 
shrimp trawling.313 Seen from a redressability perspective, if Louisiana 
stopped granting licenses to vessel operators who used illegal gear 
and gave licenses only to those who complied with TED regulations, 
then Louisiana shrimpers would either use TEDs or choose to leave 
the shrimp-trawling business. As a result, the harm to sea turtles 
would drastically decrease. 
Some critics argue that licensing cannot be a but-for cause of a 
take.314 According to Professor Jonathan Adler, if states stop issuing 
licenses altogether there is still likely to be the exact same use of gear 
that can harm endangered species.315 Adler’s point is not necessarily 
true: without a state licensing scheme, perhaps more fishermen would 
pay attention to and feel bound by the federal laws requiring TEDs.316 
Regardless, Adler’s argument manipulates the framing of the 
question. If the state continued to run a licensing program but 
stopped licensing vessels that had unlawful gear (meaning without 
TEDs), it would certainly reduce the harm being done to sea turtles. 
Lastly, Adler’s argument depends on an unrealistic premise: if states 
might be liable for licensing illegal gear, they will choose to stop 
licensing all together. Shutting down all licensing would eliminate the 
state’s ability to enforce many fisheries regulations, many of which 
have economic and political importance. 
The car-licensing analogy in Coxe demonstrates why licensing 
illegal gear can violate federal law: a state can choose to license a car, 
and the state will not be liable if the car owner chooses to traffic drugs 
in that car.317 In that case, the state has had no knowledge of the car 
 
 312. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74–75, 81 (1978) 
(determining that a but-for causal connection “would likely satisfy the second prong of the 
constitutional test for standing” and holding that the plaintiffs had standing).  
 313. See supra Part II.B. 
 314. See Adler, supra note 190, at 429.  
 315. Id.; see also Ruhl, supra note 148, at 77 (“[T]he state has an option that relieves it of the 
burden of adjusting its program so as to avoid ESA violations—don’t regulate in the first 
place.”). 
 316. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.  
 317. Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 163–64 (1st Cir. 1997). 
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owner’s illegal intentions and no role in encouraging that behavior.318 
However, Louisiana, like Massachusetts in Coxe, has licensed gear in 
precisely the way that is guaranteed to threaten endangered sea 
turtles.319 There is no unpredictable, independent action interposed 
between the licensing and the illegal act.320 The licensing of illegal 
gear is the but-for cause of sea turtle mortality. If the requested 
remedy—an injunction against licensing illegal gear—were granted, it 
would redress the injury. Therefore, prospective plaintiffs in the 
Louisiana case should be able to demonstrate standing. 
After establishing standing, to succeed on the merits the 
prospective plaintiffs would need to show that a take actually 
occurred and that Louisiana was the cause of that take, according to 
the traditional notions of proximate cause.321 Causation on the merits 
will be similar to the traceability analysis in the standing 
determination,322 but may be more difficult to prove. Standing is the 
constitutional minimum necessary for a case to be justiciable,323 so an 
analysis of causation on the merits also must incorporate any 
particular statutory requirements. In this case, the statute comes with 
implied requirements of foreseeability and proximate causation.324 
The fact that sea turtles are being taken by shrimp trawls that do 
not use TEDs is indisputable,325 and the harm caused by Louisiana’s 
licensing of illegal shrimp trawling gear is easily foreseeable. The 
Louisiana law codifying the state’s refusal to enforce TED regulations 
questioned the connection between TEDs and reduced sea turtle 
mortality,326 but before that law was passed in 1987, NMFS had found 
that “[i]ncidental capture and drowning of sea turtles by shrimp 
 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. at 164.  
 320. See supra notes 132–37 and accompanying text.  
 321. See Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 9, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B), (g) (2012) (noting 
that it is an offense to “take any such species within the United States or the territorial sea of 
the United States” or to cause the commission of a take). 
 322. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (“[E]ach element [of 
standing] must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears 
the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive 
stages of the litigation.”).  
 323. Id. at 560.  
 324. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 700 n.13 
(1995). 
 325. See supra Part I.A.  
 326. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56:57.2(A)(1)(d) (2004) (“TEDs have not been tested in 
Louisiana inshore waters to determine their effectiveness in excluding turtles or their efficiency 
in harvesting shrimp.”). 
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trawlers is a significant source of mortality for sea turtles” and 
estimated that roughly eleven thousand sea turtles were killed by 
shrimp trawls each year.327 NMFS addressed shrimpers’ concerns 
during the public comment period for the TED regulations, and 
provided data to back up its assertions that trawls do catch and kill 
sea turtles and that TEDs effectively reduce the mortality rate of sea 
turtles that interact with trawl fisheries.328 Since that time, numerous 
studies by NMFS and independent scientists have reinforced these 
two conclusions.329 A reasonable person would foresee that failing to 
enforce TED regulations would lead to a lack of compliance,330 and 
increase the number of lethal takes of sea turtles. 
Louisiana’s licensing of shrimping vessels and gear that do not 
use TEDs is also a proximate cause of the take of sea turtles. Section 
9 explicitly indicates that “to cause [a violation] to be committed” is a 
violation of the ESA in itself.331 The ESA does not require that a 
person be the only actor or even the principal actor to be liable under 
section 9.332 As long as the result is foreseeable and not too attenuated 
from the alleged cause, it satisfies the requirements laid down in 
Sweet Home and inherent in section 9. Here, the state of Louisiana 
licenses shrimp trawls without TEDs installed, thereby authorizing 
shrimp trawling that cannot be carried out “without risk of violating 
the ESA by exacting a taking.”333 In conclusion, the Louisiana 
example could probably overcome the limitations placed on vicarious 
liability litigation, but the limitations ensure that the vicarious liability 
 
 327. Sea Turtle Conservation; Shrimp Trawling Requirements, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,244 (June 29, 
1987) (codified at 50 C.F.R pts. 217, 222, 227 (2013)); see also T.A. Henwood & W.E. Stuntz, 
Analysis of Sea Turtle Captures and Mortalities During Commercial Shrimp Trawling, 85 
FISHERY BULL. 813, 813 (1987) (“Each of these [sea turtle] species are captured by commercial 
shrimp trawlers, and these incidental captures have been identified as a source of sea turtle 
mortalities.”).  
 328. Sea Turtle Conservation; Shrimp Trawling Requirements, 52 Fed. Reg. at 24,244.  
 329. See, e.g., Paolo Casale, Luc Laurent & Gregorio De Metrio, Incidental Capture of 
Marine Turtles by the Italian Trawl Fishery in the North Adriatic Sea, 119 BIOLOGICAL 
CONSERVATION 287, 287–95 (2004); Sheryan P. Epperly, Joanne Braun, Alexander J. Chester, 
Ford A. Cross, John V. Merriner & Patricia A. Tester, Winter Distribution of Sea Turtles in the 
Vicinity of Cape Hatteras and Their Interactions with the Summer Flounder Trawl Fishery, 56 
BULL. MARINE SCI. 547, 547–68 (1995); Sasso & Epperly, supra note 59, at 86–88. 
 330. See NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 3, at 136 (“[C]ompliance remains 
strongly correlated with the level of enforcement efforts.”). 
 331. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 9(g), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(g) (2012).  
 332. Id. But see Petersen, supra note 202, at 439 (“The term ‘person’ includes state and local 
governments, but state and local government liability ensues only when an agent of state or 
local government is the principal actor in taking protected species.”). 
 333. Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 164 (1st Cir. 1997). 
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doctrine is not overly permissive and will not open the door to 
harassing or frivolous lawsuits.334 
Finally, vicarious liability is practical because it helps to ensure 
that states are uniformly complying with federal law. It is not fair for 
one state to be able to disregard federal laws and gain advantage over 
all of the states that are in compliance. Assuming that TEDs lead to a 
loss of profit for shrimp trawlers, Louisiana’s shrimp vessel operators 
have an unfair advantage over those in Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, 
or North Carolina who do use TEDs. The vicarious liability doctrine 
could help address this inequality. 
Overall, acceptance of the vicarious liability doctrine would 
protect endangered species without subjecting states to frivolous 
suits. The fears of unfettered liability are largely unfounded, 
particularly in the context of a well-defined version of vicarious 
liability focused on affirmative state actions. Vicarious liability would 
help fulfill the goal of the ESA by addressing large-scale permitting 
or authorization policies that cause third parties to commit a large 
number of takes. 
CONCLUSION 
The vicarious liability doctrine has faced serious criticism from 
legal scholars. However, it plays a valuable role in effectuating the 
objectives of the ESA and the regulations put in place to protect sea 
turtles. This Note is the first piece of legal scholarship to defend the 
vicarious liability doctrine as consistent with the text and structure of 
the ESA and important for furthering the ESA’s ultimate goal of 
protecting endangered species. A limited version of the vicarious 
liability doctrine, focused on misfeasance, would provide a useful tool 
for conservationists to prevent large-scale takes without also exposing 
states to unpredictable liability. 
The current state of the shrimp fishery in Louisiana 
demonstrates how this doctrine implements the ESA’s text and 
purpose. It would be extremely difficult to catch each individual who 
takes sea turtles as he raises his nets, but it would be both possible 
and justifiable to hold Louisiana responsible for authorizing these 
takes. A suit against Louisiana would protect vulnerable sea turtle 
populations and set an important precedent that states cannot act 
with complete disrespect for the requirements of the ESA. 
 
 334. See supra notes 289–92 and accompanying text.  
